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Abstract. The paper introduces a framework based on constructive conditional
logics to define axiomatization, semantics and proof methods for access con-
trol logics. We formalize the well known says operator as a conditional nor-
mal modality and, by considering some specific combinations of access control
axioms, we define four access control logics, namely, CondUCACL , CondU4ACL ,
CondICACL and CondI4ACL . Such logics integrate access control logics with in-
tuitionistic conditional logics and provide a natural formulation of boolean prin-
cipals. The well known “speaks for” operator introduced in the logic ABLP is
defined on the top of the says modality. We provide a Kripke model semantics
for the logics and we prove that their axiomatization is sound and complete with
respect to the semantics. Also, we develop sound, complete, cut-free sequent cal-
culi for them. For the logic CondUCACL , which (as concerns atomic principals) is
slightly stronger than the logic ICL recently introduced by Garg and Abadi, we
also provide a terminating sequent calculus, thus proving that the logic is decid-
able and that validity in CondUCACL is in PSPACE.
1 Introduction
Access control is concerned with the decision of accepting or denying a request from
a principal (e.g., user, program) to do an operation on an object. In practice, an ac-
cess control system is a product of several, often independent, distributed entities with
different policies that interact in order to determine access to resources. Many formal
frameworks have been proposed to specify and reason about such systems [4, 6, 18, 22,
23]. A common feature of most well-known approaches is the employment of construc-
tive logics enriched with formulas of the form A says ϕ, intuitively meaning that the
principal A asserts or supports ϕ to hold in the system. In [2] it is shown that an intu-
itionistic interpretation of the modality “says” allows to avoid unexpected conclusions
that are derivable when says is given an axiomatization in classical logic.
In [13] an access control logic, ICL, is defined as an extension of intuitionistic
propositional logic, in which the operator says is given a modal interpretation in the
logic S4. The treatment of the operator says as a modality can also be found in [7],
which introduces a logical framework, FSL, based on multi-modal logic methodology.
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Even if there is some agreement on looking at the says construct as a modal oper-
ator, the correspondence between its axiomatization and the semantic properties asso-
ciated with axioms in the Kripke semantics is mainly unexplored. In fact, some of the
axioms of access control logics are non-standard in modal literature. The identification
of canonical properties for well-known axioms of access control logics permits to study
them separately and naturally yields completeness for logics that adopt combinations
of them. This methodology is significant if we want logic to be employed to compare
different access control models, because different systems adopt different axioms de-
pending on the specific application domain.
In this paper we show that conditional logics [25] can provide a general frame-
work to define axiomatization, semantics and proof methods for access control logics.
As a starting point, we concentrate on some specific combinations of access control
axioms, giving rise to four conditional access control logics: CondUCACL , CondU4ACL ,
CondICACL , CondI4ACL . Such logics integrate access control logics with intuitionistic
conditional logics. We formalize the says operator as a conditional normal modality
so that A says φ is regarded as a conditional implicationA⇒ φ, meaning that proposi-
tion φ holds in all the preferred worlds for the principalA. From the access control point
of view, the says operator satisfies some basic axioms of access control logics [12, 13].
The generality of this approach allows a natural formalization of boolean principals
[13], that is, principals which are formed by boolean combination of atomic principals,
as well as a natural encoding of the well known “speaks for” operator introduced in the
logic ABLP [3, 21]. We define a Kripke semantics for the conditional access control
logics, as well as sound, complete, cut-free labelled sequent calculi for them.
For the logic CondUCACL , which is slightly stronger (as concerns atomic principals)
than the logic ICL introduced in [13], we are also able to obtain a decision procedure and
a complexity upper bound, namely that the problem of deciding validity in CondUCACL is
decidable in PSPACE. This is in agreement with [13], which provides a PSPACE
complexity result for the logic ICL.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the axiomatization
of the intuitionistic conditional logics CondUCACL , CondU4ACL , CondICACL and CondI4ACL ,
and we compare them with existing approaches. In Section 3 we describe the seman-
tics of the logics. In Section 4 we show that the axiomatization is sound and complete
with respect to the semantics. In Section 5 we define cut-free sequent calculi for the
access control logics and we prove their soundness and completeness. For the logic
CondUCACL we also show that the calculus can be turned into a terminating one by adopt-
ing some restrictions on the application of some rules: this allows us to show that the
logic CondUCACL is decidable and to give a complexity upper bound for it. Section 6 con-
tains the conclusions and a discussion of related work. This work is an extended and
revised version of the work presented in [15].
2 Conditional Access Control Logics: the Axiom System
In this section, we introduce the conditional intuitionistic logics for access control by
defining their axiomatizations. The formulation of the “says” modality as a conditional
operator allows boolean principals to be modelled in a natural way, since in a con-
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ditional formula A says φ, both A and φ are formulas. For instance, we can write
A ∧ B says φ to mean that principals A and B jointly say that φ, and A ∨ B says φ
to mean that principals A and B independently say that φ. Indeed, conditional log-
ics provide a natural generalization of multimodal logics to the case when modalities
are labelled by formulas. In the following, we will regard atomic principals as atomic
propositions, distinct from all the other propositions of the language and we define
boolean principals as boolean formulas obtained by combining atomic principals with
conjunctions and disjunctions. We will assume the propositions representing principals
to have a truth value in the semantics, where a principal A is true in a world w if the
world w is visible to A. The notion of visibility we introduce is similar to the notion
of visibility introduced in [12] and in [13]. Visibility is used, for each principal A, to
identify those states of affairs (worlds) among which preferred A worlds are selected.
Following [13], we informally interpret proposition A as “A is happy”, and we mean
that A is happy in those worlds w which are visible to A.
We define the language L of the access control logics. Let ATM be a set of atomic
propositions, including a set A of propositions called atomic principals. We define a
(boolean) principal to be a boolean combination of the atomic principals in A contain-
ing only the connectives ∧ and ∨.
The formulas of L are defined inductively as follows: if P ∈ ATM , then P ∈ L;
⊥ ∈ L, where⊥ is a proposition which is always false; if ϕ, ϕ1 and ϕ2 are formulas of
L and A is a principal, then ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ϕ1 → ϕ2, and A says ϕ are formulas of
L. In the following, we will denote principals by A,B,C, . . . while we will use greek
letters for arbitrary formulas. As usual, we introduce the following precedence among
connectives: ∧,∨, says ,→. As an example,A says ϕ→ A∧B says ϕ is a formula of
L, to be read as (A says ϕ) → ((A∧B) says ϕ). The intended meaning of the formula
A says ϕ is that principal A says that ϕ, namely, “the principal A asserts or supports
ϕ” [13].
In the following we introduce the axiomatization of the logic CondUCACL , first. Then,
we present the axiomatization of the other logics by changing some characterizing ac-
cess control axioms.
The axiomatization of CondUCACL contains few basic axioms for access control log-
ics [2, 13], as well as additional axioms governing the behavior of boolean principals.
Because we privilege the modularity of the approach, we are interested in considering
each axiom separately. As a consequence, the resulting axiomatization might be redun-
dant.
2.1 Basic Axioms
The axiom system of CondUCACL contains the following axioms and inference rules, which
are intended to capture the basic properties of the says operator.
(FALSE) ⊥ → γ
(THEN-1) α→ (β → α)
(THEN-2) (α→ (β → γ)) → ((α→ β) → (α→ γ))
(AND-1) α ∧ β → α
(AND-2) α ∧ β → β
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(AND-3) α→ (β → (α ∧ β))
(OR-1) α→ α ∨ β
(OR-2) β → α ∨ β
(OR-3) (α→ β) → ((γ → β) → (α ∨ γ → β))
(K) A says (α→ β) → (A says α→ A says β)
(UNIT) α→ (A says α)
(C) A says (A says α→ α)
(MP) If ⊢ α and ⊢ α→ β then ⊢ β
(RCEA) If ⊢ A↔ B then ⊢ (A says γ) ↔ (B says γ)
(RCK) If ⊢ α→ β then ⊢ (A says α) → (A says β)
Definition 1. We say that a formula α is a theorem of the logic, and write ⊢ α if there
is a derivation of α from the above axioms and rules. We say that α can be derived from
a set of formulas Γ , and write Γ ⊢ α, if there are γ1, . . . γn (n ≥ 0) in Γ such that
⊢ γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn → α.
The definition of derivability above is taken from [8] (Definition 2.14). The axioms and
rules (FALSE), (THEN-1), (THEN-2), (AND-1), (AND-2), (AND-3), (OR-1), (OR-2),
(OR-3), and (MP) are axioms and rules of intuitionistic logic. The rule (MP) is modus
ponens. (RCK) and (RCEA) are standard inference rules for conditional logics. (RCK)
plays the role of the rule of Necessitation (if ⊢ φ then ⊢ 2φ) in modal/multimodal logic
and is derivable in both ICL [13] and DTL0 [12]. (RCEA) makes the formulasA says φ
and B says φ equivalent when the principals A and B are equivalent (i.e. if the worlds
visible to A are the same as the worlds visible to B, then principals A and B support
the same formulas). (UNIT) and (K) are the characterizing axioms of the logic ICL
[13] and other access control logics [1, 14, 29]. The axiom (K) belongs to the axiom-
atization of all normal modal logics and it is derivable in “normal” conditional logics.
Intuitively, (K) expresses that says is closed under logical consequence, while (UNIT)
is a stronger form of necessitation which states, for every formula α, that if α holds,
then α is supported by every principal. Axiom (C) has been included in the axiomati-
zation of the logic DTL0 in [12] and it comes from doxastic logic [30]. Intuitively, (C)
means that every principal says that all its statements are true.
The choice of the above axioms is meaningful in the context of access control.
However, other axioms have been proposed in the literature and different access control
logics have been defined through their combination. In particular, in alternative to (C)
and (UNIT), weaker axioms have been proposed, namely, (C4) and (I):
(C4) (A says (A says α)) → (A says α)
(I) (A says α) → (B says A says α)
(C4) belongs to the original axiomatization of the logic ICL defined in [13], where it
replaces the axiom (C). (I) is introduced in the axiomatization of the logic Binder [9],
which extends the logic ABLP [3, 21] in order to express the so called authorization
policies. Notice that (I) is a weaker version of (UNIT).
As axiom (C) is stronger than (C4), it can be proved that CondUCACL is stronger than
the logic ICL [13]:
Theorem 1. For all formulas ϕ, ⊢ICL ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
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In the following, besides CondUCACL , we introduce three other logics for access control
obtained by considering different combinations of the above axioms (UNIT), (I), (C),
and (C4), as summarized in Figure 1.
CondU4
ACL
CondIC
ACL
CondI4
ACL
CondUC
ACL
Logic (C) vs (C4)(UNIT) vs (I)
(UNIT)
(UNIT)
(I)
(I)
(C)
(C)
(C4)
(C4)
Fig. 1. Summary of constructive conditional logics under consideration.
2.2 Axioms for boolean principals
The axioms introduced above do not enforce by themselves any intended property of
boolean principals. In this subsection, we discuss the properties that are intended for
boolean principals and we introduce axioms which capture such properties. Specifically,
we focus on the intended meaning of conjunctions and disjunctions among principals.
Our interpretation of the statement A ∧ B says φ is that A and B jointly (combin-
ing their statements) say that φ. It comes from the interpretation of the statement as a
conditional implication: A and B (jointly) conditionally prove φ. Instead, our interpre-
tation of the statementA∨B says φ is that A andB disjointly (independently) say that
φ, which comes from the reading of the conditional formula as A and B (disjointly)
conditionally prove φ. Concerning the statementA∨B says φ, we expect that if bothA
says φ and B says φ, then A and B disjointly (independently) say that φ. This property
can be captured by the following axiom:
A says φ ∧B says φ→ A ∨B says φ
which corresponds to the well known axiom (CA) of conditional logics [25]. Similarly,
we can expect that the converse axiom
A ∨B says φ→ A says φ ∧B says φ
holds. The two axioms together enforce the property that A and B disjointly say that φ
if and only if A says that φ and B says that φ .
Concerning A ∧ B says φ, we expect that A and B jointly say that φ when either
A or B says that φ. This condition can be enforced by introducing the axiom
A says φ→ A ∧B says φ
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which, although is a controversial axiom of conditional logics, called monotonicity4, is
consistent with the intuitive reading of boolean principals in this intuitionistic setting.
For instance, assume that Administrator 1 says that, if user 1 is a superuser, then he has
write premissions
Admin1 says (SuperUser user1 → write perm user1 )
and that Administrator 2 says that user 1 is a superuser
Admin2 says SuperUser user1
From these two statements we can conclude that Administrator 1 and Administrator 2,
together, say that user 1 has write permissions:
Admin1 ∧ Admin2 says write perm user1
Conversely, we would like to have the property that ifA∧B says φ then, by combining
the statements of A and B, φ can be concluded. This is not equivalent to saying that ei-
therA says φ orB says φ. Indeed, the axiom (A∧B says φ) → (A says φ)∨(B says φ)
is too strong and not wanted. The wanted property could, for instance, be captured by
the second order axiom (A ∧ B says φ) → ∃ψ((A says ψ → φ) ∧ B says ψ). In the
following, however, we show that it is possible to capture the wanted property by using
standard axioms of conditional logics, namely:
(DT) A ∧B says φ→ (A says (B → φ))
(ID) A says A
Together such axioms enforce the property that if A∧B says φ then, by combining the
statements of A and B, φ can be concluded. The intended meaning of (DT) is that, if
A ∧B says φ, then A says that φ holds in all B worlds, i.e., in all the worlds visible to
the principalB or in all the worlds in whichB is happy. The meaning of (ID) is that “A
says that principal A is happy”, i.e., all the state of affairs (worlds) preferred by A are
worlds visible to A. We will come back to the notion of visibility in Section 3, when
describing the semantic conditions associated with the axioms.
In conclusion, to deal with boolean principals, the axiomatization of the conditional
access control logics introduced above includes, in addition to the axioms in Section
2.1, the following axioms:
(CA) A says φ ∧B says φ→ A ∨B says φ
(CA-conv) A ∨B says φ→ A says φ
(Mon) A says φ→ A ∧B says φ
(DT) A ∧B says φ→ (A says (B → φ))
(ID) A says A
4 In general, conditional logics only allow weaker forms of monotonicity, encoded, for instance,
by the axiom (CV) of Lewis’ logic VC.
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The first three axioms are those introduced above. Notice that, the two axioms (DT)
and (ID) allow propositions representing principals to occur on the right hand side of
the says modality.
Observe that, as a difference with ICLB [13], where implication within principals is
used to capture the “speaks for” operator, here we do not allow an implication among
principals to occur on the left hand side of the says modality. In Section 2.3, we will
address the problem of capturing the “speaks for” operator. Moreover, let us observe
that, by the normality of the conditional says modality, two principals that are logically
equivalent as, for instance, principal A ∧B and principal A ∧B ∧A support the same
formulas through the says modality. This is an advantage of conditional logic over a
multi-modal logic in which principals are simply regarded as labels of modalities.
Theorem 2. The above axiomatization is consistent.
Proof. Consistency immediately follows from the fact that, by replacingA says B with
the intuitionistic implication A → B, we obtain axioms which are all derivable in
intuitionistic logic. 
Let us observe that the above interpretation of conjunction and disjunction between
principals is different from the one given in the logic ICLB [13], which actually adopts
the opposite interpretation of ∧ and ∨: in Garg and Abadi’s logic ICLB , the meaning of
A ∧ B says φ is the same as A says φ ∧ B says φ, while A ∨ B says φ means that,
by combining the statements of A and B, φ can be concluded. Due to this difference,
the properties of the principal A ∧B in our logic are properties of the principal A ∨B
in their logic and, vice-versa, the properties of the principal A ∨ B in our logic are
properties of the principalA∧B in their logic. We do not argue that our interpretation of
boolean principals is better that the one in [13], we just observe that it naturally derives
from the interpretation of the boolean connectives in the principals, according to the
usual semantics of conditionals. Observe that the axioms (trust), (untrust) and (cuc’)
of the logic ICLB are not derivable from our axiomatization. Also, the addition of the
axiom (untrust) ⊤ says ⊥ to our axiomatization would entail that for all principals A,
A says ⊥, which is an unwanted property.
As an example, assume we want to check whether, given a set of policies Γ , a
principal A is authorized to perform φ in the logic CondUCACL , or, in other words, the
request φ from a principalA is compliant with the set of policies Γ . Intuitively, given a
set of formulas Γ representing policies and a formula φ, we say that the request φ from
a principal A is compliant with Γ if and only if φ can be derived from Γ ∪ {A says φ}
in the sense of Definition 1, i.e. if and only if Γ,A says φ ⊢ φ.
Example 1. Let Γ contain the following formulas (rules):
- Admin1 says (SuperUser user1 → write perm user1 )
- Admin2 says SuperUser user1
- ((Admin1 ∧ Admin2 ) says delete file1 ) → delete file1
-Admin1∧Admin2 says ((write perm user1 ∧ (user1 says delete file1 )) →
delete file1 )
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The first two rules have been already introduced above. By the third rule, when Admin-
istrator 1 and Administrator 2, together, say that file 1 has to be deleted, then file 1 has
to be deleted. By the last rule, when Administrator 1 and Administrator 2, together, say
that, when user 1 has write permissions and user 1 says to delete file 1, then file 1 has
to be deleted. We can prove that
Γ, user1 says delete file1 ⊢ delete file1
In fact, as we have already seen, (i) (Admin1 ∧ Admin2 ) says write perm user1
follows from the first two rules by (Mon). From user1 says delete file1 , we infer by
(UNIT) (ii) (Admin1∧Admin2 ) says (user1 says delete file1 ). By propositional rea-
soning, (RCK) and (K), from (i) and (ii), we derive (Admin1∧Admin2 ) says (write perm user1∧
(user1 says delete file1 )). Finally, from the fourth rule, we conclude (Admin1∧Admin2 )
says delete file1 , and hence, by rule 3, we conclude delete file1 .
To conclude this section, let us consider the well known axiom of conditional logics
(MP), A says φ → (A → φ). Its meaning is the following: “If A says φ, then φ holds
in all the worlds visible to principle A”.
We observe that the addition of the axiom (MP) to the logics containing the axiom
(UNIT), namely CondUCACL and CondU4ACL , would make the modality says to collapse
into intuitionistic implication. In fact, it is easy to see that the converse of (MP), namely
(A→ φ) → A says φ, can be derived from axioms (UNIT), (ID) and (K).
Proposition 1. (A→ φ) → (A says φ) is derivable in CondUCACL and CondU4ACL .
Proof. From (UNIT), we have (A→ φ) → (A says (A→ φ)). From (K), (A says (A→
φ)) → (A says A → A says φ). Hence, by propositional reasoning, (A → φ) →
(A says A→ A says φ), and then A says A→ ((A→ φ) → (A says φ)). From (ID),
A says A hence, by modus ponens, (A→ φ) → (A says φ). 
Although the addition of (MP) makes the logic collapse into intuitionistic logic in the
presence of axiom (UNIT), the same does not hold when (UNIT) is replaced by the
weaker axiom (I).
2.3 Speaks For
The Speaks For operator has been introduced in the logic ABLP [3, 21] to reason about
transfer of authority from one principal to another. We show that Speaks For can be de-
fined in the constructive conditional logics introduced above by using the says modal-
ity.
Let ⇒ be a new connective. A ⇒ B is read A speaks for B, meaning that if A
says α, then also B says α, for any formula α. In line with previous literature on access
control, the connective⇒ is ruled by the following axioms:
(Speaks For) (A⇒ B) → ((A says α) → (B says α))
(Reflexivity) A⇒ A
(Transitivity) (A⇒ B) → ((B ⇒ C) → (A⇒ C))
(Handoff) (A says (B ⇒ A)) → (B ⇒ A)
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where axioms (Speaks for) and (Handoff) relate the connective⇒with the says modal-
ity. We can define the connective⇒ by means of the says modality as follows:
A⇒ B iff B says A
In agreement with the interpretation of proposition A as “A is happy”, the meaning
of B says A is that “B says that A is happy”, i.e. that all the worlds preferred to B are
worlds visible toA (i.e. worlds in whichA is happy). It is easy to see that the connective
⇒ has the properties encoded by the four axioms above.
Theorem 3. The axioms (Speaks For), (Reflexivity), (Transitivity) and (Handoff) are
derivable in the logics CondUCACL , CondU4ACL , CondICACL , and CondI4ACL , given the def-
inition of A⇒ B as B says A.
Proof. To prove that axiom (Speaks For) is derivable, we have to prove that
(B says A) → ((A says α) → (B says α))
is derivable. Given (Mon) A says α → (A ∧ B) says α and (DT) (A ∧ B) says α →
B says (A → α), by propositional reasoning, we have that A says α → B says (A →
α) is derivable. Also, from (K), B says (A → α) → (B says A → B says α) is
derivable. By propositional reasoning, we get A says α → (B says A → B says α),
and, hence, B says A→ (A says α→ B says α) is derivable.
To prove that (Transitivity) is derivable, the formula (B says A) → ((C says B) →
(C says A)) can be shown to be derivable again by using (Mon) and (DT), as in the
previous case.
(Reflexivity) is derivable as, by (ID), A says A, which means that A⇒ A.
To prove that (Handoff) is derivable, we need to show that (A says (A says B)) →
(A says B) is derivable. For the logics containing the axiom (C), it follows immediately
from (C) and (K). For the logics containing the axiom (C4), it is an instance of (C4). 
It is important to underline that the proposed encoding of Speaks for is possible because
says is a conditional modality. Moreover, such embedding is independent from the
choice of the characterizing access control axioms we have considered.
It has to be observed that the fact that the axiom (UNIT) can be applied also to
principals may lead to some unintended conclusions. In particular, from (UNIT), when
α is the principalB, we get B → (A says B), that is,
B → (B ⇒ A)
saying that in all the worlds visible to principalB, B speaks for A, as well as
B says (B ⇒ A)
(which is not derivable in ICL⇒ [13]). By this property, we can concludeB says (A says ϕ)
from B says (B says ϕ), for all formulas ϕ. This conclusion may seem to be unin-
tended. Observe, however, that, even when the application of (UNIT) is restricted to for-
mulas that are not principals, as in [13], the propertyB says (B says ϕ) → B says (A says ϕ)
is anyhow derivable from (UNIT), (K) and (C), as well as from (UNIT), (K) and (C4).
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Hence, it holds in ICL [13], as well as in any logic including (UNIT) and the non con-
troversial axioms (K) and (C4). This may suggest that axiom (UNIT) itself is too strong
even when applied only to formulas which are not principals.
As another observation, notice that, when (RCK) is applied to principals, we get:
if ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ (A⇒ C) → (B ⇒ C).
In a sense, ⊢ A → B (all the worlds visible to A are also visible to B) appears to say
something similar to “B speaks for A”. Actually, in the presence of (UNIT), (A →
B) → (B ⇒ A) is derivable (see Proposition 1), so that ⊢ A → B entails ⊢ (A ⇒
C) → (B ⇒ C) by the (Transitivity) of ⇒. A similar property also holds in ICL⇒ as
well as in ICLB [13], namely, if ⊢ B → A, then ⊢ (A ⇒ C) → (B ⇒ C) (in ICLB it
follows from (untrust) by the transitivity of the speaks for; in ICL⇒ B ⇒ A is defined
as 2(B → A) and the property above follows form transitivity of the speaks for). The
difference among the two properties is due to a different interpretation of visibility here
as compared to visibility in [13] (see Section 3 below): here ⊢ A → B means that all
the worlds visible to A are also visible to B, while in [13] ⊢ B → A means that all the
worlds non visible to B are non visible to A. Actually, (by contraposition) they have
the same meaning.
In the following we will provide a semantics for the four access control logics in-
troduced so far.
3 Conditional Access Control Logics: the Semantics
In this section we introduce a Kripke semantics for the four access control logics intro-
duced above. As the Speaks For connective is a defined connective, we will not take the
Speaks For into consideration in this section.
We first define the semantics of CondUCACL , then we present the semantics of the
other logics by deifning the characterizing conditions on their models. The semantics
of the logic CondUCACL is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A CondUCACL model has the form M = (S,≤, {RA}, h) where: S 6= ∅
is a set of items called worlds; ≤ is a preorder over S; RA is a binary relation on S
associated with the formula A; h is an evaluation function ATM −→ Pow(S) that
associates to each atomic proposition P the set of worlds in which P is true.
We define the truth conditions of a formula φ ∈ L with respect to a world t ∈ S
in a model M, by the relation M, t |= φ, as follows. We use [|φ|] to denote {y ∈ S |
M, y |= φ}.
1. M, t |= P ∈ ATM iff, for all s such that t ≤ s, s ∈ h(P )
2. M, t |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, t |= ϕ andM, t |= ψ
3. M, t |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, t |= ϕ or M, t |= ψ
4. M, t |= ϕ→ ψ iff for all s such that t ≤ s (if M, s |= ϕ then M, s |= ψ)
5. M, t 6|= ⊥
6. M, t |= A says ψ iff, for all s such that tRAs, M, s  ψ.
Given a world t ∈ S and a formula A ∈ L, we define RA(t) = {s ∈ S | tRAs}. The
relations ≤ and RA must satisfy the following conditions:
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∀t, s, z ∈ S, if s ≤ t and tRAz then sRAz; (S-Int)
∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt, then s ≤ t; (S-UNIT)
∀t, s, z ∈ S, if sRAt and t ≤ z, then zRAz; (S-C)
RA∨B(t) = RA(t) ∪RB(t); (S-CA)
∀t, s, z ∈ S, if sRA∧Bt, then sRAt and sRBt; (S-Mon)
∀t, s, z ∈ S, if sRAt and t ≤ z, and z ∈ [|B|], then sRA∧Bz; (S-DT)
∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt, then t ∈ [|A|]; (S-ID)
if [|A|] = [|B|], then RA = RB . (S-RCEA)
We say that φ is valid in a model M if M, t |= φ for all t ∈ S. We say that φ is valid
tout court (and write |= φ) if φ is valid in every model. We extend the notion of validity
to a set of formulas Γ in the obvious way: for all t, M, t |= Γ if M, t |= ψ for all
ψ ∈ Γ . Last, we say that φ is a logical consequence of Γ (and write Γ |= φ) if, for all
models M, for all worlds t ∈ S, if M, t |= Γ , then M, t |= φ.
Condition (S-Int) enforces the property that when a formulaA says φ is true in a world
t, it is also true in all worlds reachable from t by the relation ≤ (i.e., in all worlds s
such that t ≤ s). All the other semantic conditions are those associated with the axioms
of the logic, apart from condition (S-RCEA), which is the well-known condition for
normality in conditional logics, claiming that the accessibility relationRA is associated
with the semantic interpretation ofA. Namely, if the worlds in whichA is visible are the
same as those in which B is visible, then the worlds reachable by RA are the same as
those reachable by RB . (S-CA) is the semantic condition for both axioms (CA) and its
converse. Notice that, the fact that we represent the binary relation RA as indexed by a
formula does not mean that the semantics for conditional logic is second-order. In fact,
RA represent a selection function (which is used in most formulations of conditional
logic semantics), in which sRAt corresponds to t ∈ f([|A|], s), where [|A|] is a set
of worlds. In this view, the semantic conditions above must be intended as first-order
because they quantify over individuals (i.e. worlds) and subsets of the domain (indexes
of the binary relation) identified by formulas of the language 5.
Note also that the semantic conditions for some of the axioms, as for instance (DT),
slightly depart from the semantic conditions usually given to these axioms in condi-
tional logic. This is due to the fact that our logics are intuitionistic conditional logics
and the implication occurring within axioms is intuitionistic implication. Observe that
the satisfiability of atomic propositions is defined as usual in intuitionistic logic: the
evaluation of a proposition in a world depends on the evaluation of that proposition in
all the worlds reachable by ≤.
Our semantics assigns a truth value to atomic and boolean principals. The intended
meaning is that a principal A is true in a world w when w is visible to A. The notion
of visibility of a world to a principal has been used in the context of access control in
[13] as well as in [12]. In particular, the Kripke models for ICL [13] include a view
map, mapping each principal A to the set of worlds which are not visible to A. The
Kripke semantics in [12] makes use of a view function θ which maps each world to
5 It is well known that the extension of first-order logic with quantification over a family of
subsets of the domain does not add expressivity because it is equivalent to multi-sorted first-
order logic (see [10] Section 4.4).
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the set of principals to which the worlds is visible, and it includes the semantic con-
dition (Imp-mon) w ≤ w′ implies θ(w) ⊆ θ(w′), which requires that, if a world is
visible to a principal A, then all the worlds reachable from w are visible to A. As a
difference with [13] (and similarly to [12]), a property analogous to (Imp-mon) holds in
our semantics. Notice that, although the notion of visibility introduced in [13] and [12]
is not expressible at the language level, and, in particular, it is not expressible in ICL
and ICLB, however, it can be expressed in the S4 embedding of ICL and ICLB , where
a principal A is not forced to occur on the left hand side of the says modality. Our
choice of allowing principals to freely occur within formulas, is dictated by the need to
provide an axiomatic counterpart to all the semantic conditions in the Kripke models.
Concerning the interpretation of boolean conditionals and, in particular, of the con-
junction between principals, it can be proved that, from the semantic conditions (S-
Mon), (S-ID) and (S-DT) it follows that:
Proposition 2. RA∧B(t) = RA(t) ∩RB(t).
Proof. First, we prove thatRA∧B(s) ⊆ RA(s)∩RB(s). Let t ∈ S be a world such that
sRA∧Bt. By (S-Mon), we immediately conclude that also sRAt and sRBt, and we are
done.
Finally, we prove that RA(s) ∩RB(s) ⊆ RA∧B(s). Let t ∈ S be a world such that
(i) sRAt and (ii) sRBt. By (S-ID), from (ii) it follows that (iii) t ∈ [|B|]. Since ≤ is
reflexive, we have that t ≤ t. By (S-DT), from (i) sRAt, t ≤ t, and (iii) t ∈ [|B|], we
conclude that sRA∧Bt and we are done. 
By the presence of the axiom (C), it turns out that the semantic condition (S-DT) can
be equivalently expressed as follows:
Proposition 3. In the axiomatization of CondUCACL , the following are equivalent:
1. ∀t, s, z ∈ S, if sRAt and t ≤ z, and z ∈ [|B|], then sRA∧Bz;
2. ∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt and t ∈ [|B|], then sRA∧Bt.
Proof. Let us first prove that, if 1. holds, then also 2. holds. Since ≤ is reflexive, we
have that t ≤ t. By replacing z with t in 1., we have that, ∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt and
t ∈ [|B|], then sRA∧Bt, i.e. 2. holds. Now we prove that, if 2. holds, then also 1. holds.
Suppose that sRAt and consider t ≤ z. By the semantic condition (S-C), we have
that also zRAz. By (S-UNIT), we can also observe that s ≤ t since sRAt. Since ≤ is
transitive, from s ≤ t and t ≤ z it follows that s ≤ z. By the semantic condition (S-Int),
since zRAz and s ≤ z, we have that also sRAz. If z ∈ [|B|], since sRAz, by 2. we
have that sRA∧Bz, i.e. also 1. holds. 
This allows the semantic condition (S-DT) to be equivalently expressed in CondUCACL as
follows:
∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt and t ∈ [|B|], then sRA∧Bt (S-DT)
Let us now introduce the semantic properties that correspond to axioms (C4) and (I)
introduced above as alternatives to (C) and (UNIT), characterizing the logics CondU4ACL ,
CondICACL and CondI4ACL , as follows:
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∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt, then ∃z ∈ S such that sRAz and zRAt; (S-C4)
∀t, s, u ∈ S, if tRBs and sRAu, then tRAu (S-I)
Definition 3. A model for the logics CondU4ACL , CondICACL and CondI4ACL is as in Def-
inition 2. The relations ≤ and RA satisfy the semantic conditions characterizing each
logic as stated in Figure 2.
CondU4
ACL
CondIC
ACL
CondI4
ACL
(S-UNIT)
(S-C)
(S-CA) (S-Mon) (S-DT) (S-ID) (S-RCEA)
(S-CA) (S-Mon) (S-DT) (S-ID) (S-RCEA)
(S-CA) (S-Mon) (S-DT) (S-ID) (S-RCEA)
(S-I)
(S-C4)
(S-I) (S-C4)
(S-Int)
(S-Int)
(S-Int)
Fig. 2. Conditions of relations ≤ and RA for CondU4ACL , CondICACL and CondI4ACL .
It is worth noticing that (S-UNIT) and (S-Int), together, imply the condition (S-I). In-
deed, consider tRBs and sRAu. By (S-UNIT), from tRBs we obtain that t ≤ s. By
(S-Int), it immediately follows that tRAu, and we are done.
4 Soundness and Completeness of the Axiomatizations with
respect to the Semantics
In this section we prove that the axiomatizations of the four conditional access control
logics introduced above are sound and complete with respect to their semantics as de-
fined in Section 3. As in the previous sections, we first consider the logic CondUCACL .
The completeness proof we present is based on the proof of completeness for the Kripke
semantics of intuitionistic logic in [31] and extends it to deal with the modality says
in the language and, more precisely, with the interplay between the relation ≤ and the
accessibility relations RA associated with says .
Definition 4 (Consistency). Let Γ be a set of formulas. Γ is consistent iff Γ 6⊢ ⊥. If
Γ has an infinite number of formulas, we say that Γ is consistent iff there are no finite
Γ0 ⊂ Γ such that Γ0 ⊢ ⊥.
Definition 5 (Saturation). Let Γ be a set of formulas, we say that Γ is saturated iff
1. Γ is consistent (Definition 4); 2. if Γ ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ ; 3. if Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ, then
Γ ⊢ ϕ or Γ ⊢ ψ.
Lemma 1 (Saturated Extensions). Let Γ be a set of formulas. Suppose Γ 6⊢ ϕ, then
there is a saturated set Γ ∗ such that Γ ⊆ Γ ∗ and Γ ∗ 6⊢ ϕ.
Proof. This is proven as in [31]. We obtain Γ ∗ as ⋃{Γ k : k ∈ N}. We let Γ0 = Γ , and
inductively define Γ k. Let {B0,1 ∨ B0,2, . . . Bn,1 ∨Bn,2, . . .} be an enumeration with
infinite repetitions of all the disjunctions of the language. We define Γ k+1 as follows:
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– Γ k+1 = Γ k ∪ {Bk,i} if Γ k ⊢ Bk,1 ∨Bk,2, where i is the least of {1, 2} such that
Γ k ∪ {Bk,i} 6⊢ ϕ
– Γ k otherwise.
It can be easily shown that Γ ∗ is saturated, that Γ ⊆ Γ ∗ , and that Γ ∗ 6⊢ ϕ. 
Definition 6 (Canonical model construction). We fix a language LC ⊆ L and we
define M = (S,≤, {RA}, h) such that: S is the set of all saturated Γ on the language
LC ; Γ1 ≤ Γ2 iff Γ1 ⊆ Γ2; Γ1RAΓ2 iff {α | A says α ∈ Γ1} ⊆ Γ2; for all P ∈ ATM ,
h(P ) = {Γ ∈ S | P ∈ Γ}.
We can prove the following Lemmas:
Lemma 2. Let Γ be a set of formulas and let ∆ = {ϕ : A says ϕ ∈ Γ}. If ∆ ⊢ ψ,
then Γ ⊢ A says ψ.
Proof. If ∆ ⊢ ψ, by definition of ⊢ there must be {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ ∆ such that ⊢
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn → ψ. By (RCK) and (K), ⊢ A says ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧A says ϕn → A says ψ,
and from definition of ⊢ (and since A says ϕi ∈ Γ for all i = 1, . . . , n) we conclude
that Γ ⊢ A says ψ. 
Lemma 3. For all Γ ∈ S and each formula ϕ ∈ L, we have that M, Γ |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ .
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. In case ϕ is an atomic formula, the lemma
holds by definition of h. For ϕ ≡ φ ∧ ψ the proof is easy and left to the reader. For
ϕ ≡ φ∨ψ, then Γ |= φ∨ψ ⇔ (Γ |= φ or Γ |= ψ) ⇔ (φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ ) ⇔ φ∨ψ ∈ Γ
(by the saturation of Γ ). For ϕ ≡ φ→ ψ, suppose Γ |= φ→ ψ. Then for all saturated
Γ
′
⊇ Γ we have that if Γ ′ |= φ, then Γ ′ |= ψ. Assume Γ 6⊢ φ→ ψ, then Γ ∪{φ} 6⊢ ψ;
let Γ ′ be a saturated extension of Γ ∪ {φ} such that Γ ′ 6⊢ ψ, then Γ ′ |= φ but not
Γ
′
|= ψ (induction hypothesis). This contradicts Γ |= φ → ψ. Hence Γ ⊢ φ → ψ.
As Γ is saturated, by condition 2 in Definition 5, φ → ψ ∈ Γ . For the converse,
let φ → ψ ∈ Γ . For a contradiction suppose Γ 6|= φ → ψ. Then there would be
a Γ ′ with Γ ⊆ Γ ′ such that Γ ′ |= φ but Γ ′ 6|= ψ. Since Γ ⊆ Γ ′, φ → ψ ∈ Γ ′.
Furthermore by inductive hypothesis φ ∈ Γ ′. Hence there are γ1 . . . γn ∈ Γ ′ such that
⊢ γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn → (φ → ψ) and ⊢ γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn → φ. From the axiomatization (and
saturation) it follows that ψ ∈ Γ ′, which contradicts ψ 6∈ Γ ′ deriving from Γ ′ 6|= ψ
by the inductive hypothesis. Therefore Γ |= φ → ψ. For ϕ ≡ A says φ, suppose
Γ |= A says φ. Hence, for all Γ ′ such that ΓRAΓ ′, Γ ′ |= φ. By inductive hypothesis,
φ ∈ Γ ′. Let ∆ = {α : A says α ∈ Γ}. By construction, Γ ′ ⊇ ∆. Assume, for a
contradiction, that A says φ 6∈ Γ . By condition 2 in Definition 5, Γ 6⊢ A says φ. Then,
by Lemma 2, ∆ 6⊢ φ. By Lemma 1, there is a saturated extension ∆∗ of ∆ such that
∆∗ 6⊢ φ, i.e. φ 6∈ ∆∗. By definition of RA, ΓRA∆∗. This contradicts the fact that, for
all Γ ′ such that ΓRAΓ ′, φ ∈ Γ ′. The converse can be easily shown. 
Lemma 4. Let M be the canonical model as defined in Definition 6. M satisfies the
conditions (S-Int), (S-UNIT), (S-C), (S-CA), (S-Mon), (S-DT), (S-ID), and (S-RCEA).
Proof. We consider each property:
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(S-Int) Let Γ ≤ Γ ′ and Γ ′RAΓ ′′. Consider any φ s.t. A says φ ∈ Γ . By definition of ≤,
A says φ ∈ Γ ′, hence by ΓRAΓ ′′, φ ∈ Γ ′′. By definition of RA it follows that
ΓRAΓ
′′
.
(S-UNIT) Let ΓRAΓ ′. We want to show that Γ ≤ Γ ′. Let α ∈ Γ . By (UNIT), α →
A says α ∈ Γ , hence (by saturation of Γ ) A says α ∈ Γ . Hence, by construction
of the canonical model, α ∈ Γ ′. Therefore, Γ ≤ Γ ′.
(S-C) We have to prove that if ΓRAΓ ′, and Γ ′ ≤ Γ ′′, then Γ ′′RAΓ ′′. By (C) we know
that for all φ, A says (A says φ → φ) ∈ Γ , hence A says φ → φ ∈ Γ ′, and
also A says φ → φ ∈ Γ ′′ (by definition of ≤). From this it follows that for all
A says φ ∈ Γ ′′, by saturation of Γ ′′, φ ∈ Γ ′′. By definition of RA we conclude
that Γ ′′RAΓ ′′.
(S-CA) In order to show that RA∨B = RA ∪ RB we have to consider two directions. 1.
Let ΓRAΓ ′. For all C : A ∨ B says C ∈ Γ , by (CA-conv) also A says C ∈ Γ ,
hence C ∈ Γ ′. We conclude that ΓRA∨BΓ ′. The same holds if ΓRBΓ ′. Hence,
RA ∪RB ⊆ RA∨B . 2. Let ΓRA∨BΓ ′. Suppose that not ΓRAΓ ′, i.e. there is C s.t.
A says C ∈ Γ and C 6∈ Γ ′. We want to show that in this case ΓRBΓ ′. Consider
any D s.t. B says D ∈ Γ . By (RCK), and by saturation of Γ , A says C ∨ D ∈ Γ
and B says C ∨D ∈ Γ . By (CA) A ∨B says C ∨D. It follows that C ∨D ∈ Γ ′,
and since C 6∈ Γ ′, D ∈ Γ ′. We have shown that if not ΓRAΓ ′, then ΓRBΓ ′. We
can reason symmetrically in case not ΓRBΓ ′. Hence, RA∨B ⊆ RA ∪RB .
(S-Mon) Let ΓRA∧BΓ ′. Consider φ s.t. A says φ ∈ Γ . By (Mon) it follows that A ∧
B says φ ∈ Γ , hence φ ∈ Γ ′ and, by definition of RA, ΓRAΓ ′. The same holds
for RB .
(S-DT) We have to show that if ΓRAΓ ′, Γ ′ ≤ Γ ′′, and Γ ′′ ∈ [|B|], then ΓRA∧BΓ ′′, i.e.
{φ: A ∧ B says φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ Γ ′′. Consider φ such that A ∧ B says φ ∈ Γ . Then,
by (DT), A says (B → φ) ∈ Γ , hence by definition of RA, B → φ ∈ Γ ′, and by
definition of ≤, B → φ ∈ Γ ′′. Furthermore, from Γ ′′ ∈ [|B|], B ∈ Γ ′′ by Lemma
3. By saturation of Γ ′′, we conclude that φ ∈ Γ ′′.
(S-ID) Let ΓRAΓ ′. By (ID) A says A ∈ Γ and, by definition of RA, A ∈ Γ ′ and, by
Lemma 3, Γ ′ ∈ [[A]].
(S-RCEA) If [[A]] = [[B]], then ⊢ A ↔ B, otherwise by Lemma 1 there would be Γ ∈ S
such that A ↔ B 6∈ Γ . In this case, by Lemma 3 Γ 6|= A ↔ B hence there would
be a Γ ′ s.t. Γ ≤ Γ ′ and Γ ′ |= A but Γ ′ 6|= B (or viceversa). This contradicts
the hypothesis that [[A]] = [[B]]. Furthermore, from ⊢ A ↔ B, by (RCEA) we
conclude that A says φ ↔ B says φ ∈ Γ for each Γ ∈ S. Therefore, for all
Γ, Γ ′ ∈ S, ΓRAΓ ′ iff ΓRBΓ ′, and hence RA = RB . 
By the above lemmas, we can conclude that the axiomatization of the logic CondUCACL given
in Section 2 is complete with respect to the semantics in Definition 2:
Theorem 4 (Soundness and Completeness of CondUCACL ). Given a formula ϕ ∈ L,
|= ϕ iff ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. Concerning the completeness, for a contradiction,
suppose 6⊢ ϕ. Then by Lemma 1 there is a saturated set Γ ∗ such that Γ ∗ 6⊢ ϕ, hence
ϕ 6∈ Γ ∗. By Definition 6 and Lemmas 3 and 4, we conclude that there is a (canonical)
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model M = (S,≤, {RA}, h), made on the language of ϕ, with Γ ∗ ∈ S, such that
M, Γ ∗ 6|= ϕ. It follows that ϕ is not logically valid, i.e. 6|= ϕ. 
We can also show that soundness and completeness apply to the logics CondU4ACL ,
CondICACL and CondI4ACL , obtained respectively when replacing (C) with (C4) or (UNIT)
with (I) or both in CondUCACL .
Theorem 5 (Soundness and Completeness of CondICACL ). The axiomatization of the
logic CondICACL , obtained by replacing (UNIT) with (I), is sound and complete with
respect to the semantics of Definition 2 in which (S-UNIT) is replaced with (S-I) of
Definition 3.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. For completeness, we reason as done above. We
prove that if the logic contains (I) instead of (UNIT) then it satisfies (S-I).
(S-I) Let ΓRBΓ ′ and Γ ′RAΓ ′′. Consider φ s.t.A says φ ∈ Γ . By (I)B says (A says φ) ∈
Γ , hence A says φ ∈ Γ ′ and φ ∈ Γ ′′. We conclude that ΓRAΓ ′′. 
Theorem 6 (Soundness and Completeness of CondU4ACL ). The axiomatization of the
logic CondU4ACL , obtained by replacing (C) with (C4), is sound and complete with re-
spect to the semantics of Definition 2 in which (S-C) is replaced with (S-C4) of Defini-
tion 3.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. For completeness, we reason as done above. We
prove that if the logic contains (C4) instead of (C) the logic satisfies (S-C4).
(S-C4) Let ΓRAΓ ′. Consider ∆ = {φ : A says φ ∈ Γ}. Clearly, by definition of RA,
∆ ⊆ Γ ′. Consider now the saturation ∆∗ of ∆ obtained as follows. Consider the
disjunctive normal form corresponding to ∆: D1 ∨ . . . ∨ Dn. Since ∆ is consis-
tent there must be one Di such that ∆ 6⊢ ¬Di. Furthermore, there must also exist
one such Di in which any formula A says φ positively occurs only if φ ∈ Γ ′. For
a contradiction suppose that for each Di consistent with ∆ there was an occur-
rence of A says φ with φ 6∈ Γ ′. Then there would be A says φ1 . . . A says φj with
φ1 . . . φj 6∈ Γ ′ such that ∆ ⊢ A says φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ A says φj . But in this case also
∆ ⊢ A says (φ1∨. . .∨φn), and by Lemma 2, Γ ⊢ A says (A says (φ1∨. . .∨φn)).
By (C4) also Γ ⊢ A says (φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn), and hence (φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn) ∈ ∆ ⊆ Γ ′,
which contradicts that Γ ′ is saturated but none of φ1 . . . φn belongs to Γ ′. From
this contradiction we conclude that there must be a Di consistent with ∆ and such
that for any positive occurrence of A says φ, φ ∈ Γ ′. We saturate ∆ with this dis-
junct, obtaining ∆∗. It can be easily shown that ∆∗ is saturated, and that ΓRA∆∗
and ∆∗RAΓ ′. 
Theorem 7 (Soundness and Completeness of CondI4ACL ). The axiomatization of the
logic CondI4ACL , obtained by replacing (UNIT) with (I) and (C) with (C4), respectively,
is sound and complete with respect to the semantics of Definition 2 in which (S-UNIT)
is replaced with (S-I) and (S-C) is replaced with (S-C4).
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5 A sequent calculus for Conditional Access Control Logics
In this section we present a cut-free sequent calculus for the four conditional logics for
access control we propose. Our calculus is called SCondACL and it makes use of labels
to represent possible worlds, following the line of SeqS, a sequent calculus for standard
conditional logics introduced in [26]. In particular, the calculus we propose is formu-
lated following the methods developed in [24] to obtain height-preserving admissibility
of weakening and contraction, admissibility of cut, and decidability for modal labelled
calculi. In the following, by SCondACL we refer to the calculus for any of the four logics
under consideration. For the logic CondUCACL , we also show that we can control the ap-
plication of some crucial rules, obtaining a terminating calculus ̂SCondUCACL . This calculus
describes a decision procedure for CondUCACL , and allows us to conclude that provability
is decidable in O(n4logn) space.
In addition to the language L of the logic CondUCACL , we consider a denumerable
alphabet of labels X , whose elements are denoted by x, y, z, . . .. Moreover, in order to
obtain a terminating calculus, we define the set LP ⊆ L of principals involved in the
computation. Given a set of policies Γ and a request ϕ of compliance of a principal A
(i.e. we want to verify whether Γ,A says ϕ |= ϕ), we assume that the set LP contains
at least A and all principals B such that, for some φ, B says φ appears in Γ .
The calculus SCondACL manipulates three types of labelled formulas:
1. world formulas, denoted by x : α, where x ∈ X and α ∈ L, used to represent that
the formula α holds in a world x;
2. transition formulas, denoted by x A−→ y, representing that xRAy;
3. order formulas of the form y ≥ x representing the preorder relation ≤.
A sequent is a pair 〈Γ,∆〉, usually denoted with Γ ⊢ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are mul-
tisets of labelled formulas. The intuitive meaning of a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is: every model
that satisfies all labelled formulas of Γ in the respective worlds (specified by the la-
bels) satisfies at least one of the labelled formulas of ∆ (in those worlds). This is made
precise by the notion of validity of a sequent given in the next definition:
Definition 7 (Sequent validity). Given a model M = (S,≤, {RA}, h) for L, and a
label alphabet X , we consider a mapping I : X → S. Let F be a labelled formula, we
defineM |=I F as follows:
– M |=I x : α iff M, I(x) |= α;
– M |=I x
A
−→ y iff I(x)RAI(y);
– M |=I y ≥ x iff I(x) ≤ I(y).
We say that Γ ⊢ ∆ is valid in M if, for every mapping I : X → S, if M |=I F for
every F ∈ Γ , thenM |=I G for some G ∈ ∆. We say that Γ ⊢ ∆ is valid in CondUCACL
if it is valid in every M.
In Figure 3 we present the basic rules of the calculi SCondACL , common to all the logics
under considerations. In Figure 4 we present the specific rules to adopt in order to
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(AX) (AX⊥) (AX≥)
(→ L)
(→ R)
( says R)
( says L)
(∧R) (∧L)
(ATM )
(EQ)
(CA)
(ID)(DT )
(MON )
(CA− conv)
F either x : P, P ∈ ATM or y ≥ x
y new
A ∨B ∈ LP
A ∧B ∈ LP
(TR)
u new
(∨R) (∨L)
y new
(INT )
Γ, F ⊢ ∆, F Γ, x : ⊥ ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆, x ≥ x
Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x Γ, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆ Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α ∧ β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α
Γ, x : α ∧ β ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α, x : β ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α, x : β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α ∨ β
Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆Γ, x : α ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α ∨ β ⊢ ∆
Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆, y : β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α→ β
Γ, z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α Γ, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : A says α
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : α
Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆, x
A
−→ y
u : B ⊢ u : Au : A ⊢ u : B
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, x
B
−→ y
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A∨B
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, x
A∨B
−→ y Γ, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, x
A∧B
−→ y
A ∧B ∈ LP
A ∨B ∈ LP
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : A says α, y : α ⊢ ∆
Basic Rules
Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
P ∈ ATM
Fig. 3. Basic rules of the sequent calculus SCondACL .
(Unit)
(C)
z new
(C4)
(I)
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, z
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆ Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y, x
A
−→ z, z
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆ Γ, x
B
−→ y, y
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
B
−→ y, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
Fig. 4. Additional rules for CondUCACL , CondU4ACL , CondICACL , CondI4ACL .
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CondU4
ACL
CondIC
ACL
CondI4
ACL
CondUC
ACL
Logic Calculus Rules
Basic Rules
Basic Rules
Basic Rules
Basic Rules
S
CondUC
ACL
S
CondU4
ACL
S
CondIC
ACL
S
CondI4
ACL
+ (Unit) + (C)
+ (Unit) + (C4)
+ (I) + (C4)
+ (I) + (C)
Fig. 5. Calculi and rules for the constructive conditional access control logics.
deal with one of the presented conditional access control logics, namely CondUCACL ,
CondU4ACL , CondICACL , or CondI4ACL , following the schema of Figure 5.
As usual, we say that a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable in SCondACL if it admits a
derivation. A derivation is a tree whose nodes are sequents. A branch is a sequence of
nodes Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, . . . , Γn ⊢ ∆n, . . . Each node Γi ⊢ ∆i is obtained from its
immediate successor Γi−1 ⊢ ∆i−1 by applying backward a rule of SCondACL , having
Γi−1 ⊢ ∆i−1 as the conclusion and Γi ⊢ ∆i as one of its premises. A branch is closed if
one of its nodes is an instance of axioms, namely (AX), (AX≥), and (AX⊥), otherwise
it is open. We say that a tree is closed if all its branches are closed. A sequent Γ ⊢ ∆
has a derivation in SCondACL if there is a closed tree having Γ ⊢ ∆ as a root.
The axioms represent valid sequents. For instance, (AX) is used to close a branch
with a sequent in which a formula F belongs to both its left hand side and its right hand
side: F is either a formula x : P , where P is an atom, or a formula y ≥ x. Such a
sequent is obviously valid : given any model satisfying all the formulas in the left hand
side, then also the formula F , then there is at least one formula in the righ-hand side
holding in such a model, the formula F itself. Similarly for the other axioms. The rule
(ATM ) is used to support the condition 1. in Definition 2, namely, given a modelM, a
world t and an atomic formula P not being a principal, we have that M, t |= P if and
only if, for all s such that t ≤ s, we have that s ∈ h(P ). Given a sequent containing
x : P in the left hand side, the rule (i) checks whether the premise in which y ≥ x
is added to the right hand side of the sequent is valid: intuitively, this corresponds to
finding a world (represented by y) which is “greater” than the one represented by x; (ii)
introduces y : P in the other premise, in order to impose that the atom P also holds
in the world represented by y such that y ≥ x. The rule (INT ) supports the condition
(S-Int) in Definition 2: if a sequent contains the formulas y ≥ x and y A−→ z in its left
hand side, then the rule introduces also the transition formula x A−→ z, and then checks
whether the resulting premise is derivable. The rule (TR) takes care of the transitivity of
the relation≤ in an obvious way: if both z ≥ y and y ≥ x belong to the left hand side of
a sequent, then also the relation z ≥ x is added to the left hand side of the premise that
the calculus tries to derive. The rule (Unit) is used to support the condition (S-UNIT)
in Definition 2: if the sequent under consideration contains a transition formula x A−→ y
in its left hand side, then the rule introduces also the relation y ≥ x. Similarly for the
other rules related to the other semantic conditions. Some of them are related to the
conditions introduced to support boolean principals. As an example, the rule (MON )
is used to support the condition (S-Mon) in Definition 2. Intuitively, given a sequent
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(AX)
. . . , y ≥ x ⊢ y : P, y ≥ x
(AX)
. . . , x : P, y : P ⊢ y : P
(ATM )
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : P, x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : P
(Unit)
x ≥ u, x : P, x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : P
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : P ⊢ x : A says P
(→ R)
⊢ u : P → (A says P )
Fig. 6. A derivation in SCondACL for an instance of the axiom (UNIT).
Γ ⊢ ∆, the rule works as follows: the left premise checks whether Γ ⊢ ∆,x A∧B−→ y
is a valid sequent, trying to check whether there is a world (represented by the label
y) reachable from the world represented by x given the boolean principal A ∧ B; the
right premise adds tra transitions x A−→ y and x B−→ y according to the condition (S-
Mon). The side condition is introduced in order to ensure that A ∧B belongs to the set
of available principals. Similarly for the other rules supporting the other conditions of
boolean principals. The rule (EQ) is used in order to support the rule (RCEA), roughly
speaking the rule has to ensure that, if A and B are equivalent, i.e. they are true in
the same worlds, then, given a world represented by x, the selection function selects
the same worlds for x (represented by y) for both A and B. To this aim, if a sequent
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
B
−→ y has to be proved, then the (EQ) rule introduces a branch in
the backward derivation, trying to find a proof for both sequents u : A ⊢ u : B and
u : B ⊢ u : A. The restrictions on the rules (→ R), ( says R), and (EQ) are necessary
to preserve the soundness of the calculus.
As an example, in Figure 6 we show a derivation in SCondACL of an instance of the
axiom (UNIT). Given P ∈ ATM , in order to show that the formula P → (A says P )
is valid, we build a derivation in SCondACL for the sequent ⊢ u : P → (A says P ).
The calculus SCondACL is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. In order
to prove it, we need some basic structural properties.
5.1 Basic Structural properties of SCondACL
First of all, we define the complexity of a labelled formula:
Definition 8 (Complexity of a labelled formula cp(F)). We define the complexity of a
labelled formula F as follows:
– cp(x : γ) = 2 ∗ | γ |
– cp(x : ⊥) = 2
– cp(y ≥ x) = 2
– cp(x
A
−→ y) = 2 ∗ | A | + 1
where | F | is the number of symbols occurring in the string representing F .
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Now we can introduce some basic structural properties holding in SCondACL . First,
we show that weakening and label substitution are height preserving admissible in
SCondACL . As usual, the height of a derivation corresponds to the height of the tree
representing the derivation itself.
Lemma 5 (Height-preserving admissibility of weakening). If Γ ⊢ ∆ has a deriva-
tion of height h, then Γ ⊢ ∆,F and Γ, F ⊢ ∆ have a derivation of height h′ ≤ h.
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆. The base case is straight-
forward: if Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of an axiom, so are Γ ⊢ ∆,F and Γ, F ⊢ ∆. For the
inductive step, we have to consider all possibile rules applied to Γ ⊢ ∆ in a backward
proof search. We distinguish two subcases:
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆ is ended by an application of (EQ) as follows:
u : A ⊢ u : B u : B ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
B
−→ y
All formulas different from the transition formulas involved in the rule application
are side formulas in (EQ), therefore we can conclude as follows:
u : A ⊢ u : B u : B ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y, F ⊢ ∆′, x
B
−→ y
and similarly to prove that also Γ ′, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x B−→ y, F is derivable;
– the derivation is ended by the application of a rule which is different from (EQ).
As an example, we present the case of (DT ), the other ones are similar and left to
the reader:
(1) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B (2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(DT )
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
We can apply the inductive hypothesis on the two premises, obtaining derivations
for (1′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, F ⊢ ∆, z : B, (1′′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B,F ,
(2′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ y, F ⊢ ∆, and (2′′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, x A∧B−→
y ⊢ ∆,F . We obtain a derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, F ⊢ ∆ by an application
of (DT ) to (1′) and (2′), as well as a derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆,F by
applying (DT ) to (1′′) and (2′′). 
Lemma 6 (Height-preserving label substitution). If a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ has a deriva-
tion of height h, then Γ [x/y] ⊢ ∆[x/y] has a derivation of height h′ ≤ h, where
Γ [x/y] ⊢ ∆[x/y] is the sequent obtained from Γ ⊢ ∆ by replacing all occurrences of
the label x by the label y.
Proof. By induction on the height of Γ ⊢ ∆. The base case is straightforward: if Γ ⊢ ∆
is an axiom, it is still an axiom if we replace each x with y. For the inductive step, we
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only present the most interesting case of ( says R), the other cases are easy and left to
the reader. Consider the following derivation:
(i) Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, y : γ
( says R)
Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : A says γ
In order to obtain a derivation (of at most the same height) of Γ [x/y] ⊢ ∆′[x/y], y :
A says γ we proceed as follows. First, we apply the inductive hypothesis to (i) by
replacing all occurrences of y with z, with z not occurring in Γ and ∆′. Notice that, by
the condition on the application of ( says R), y is new in (i), that is to say y does not
occur in Γ and ∆′. It follows that we have a derivation of (ii) Γ, x A−→ z ⊢ ∆′, z : γ,
whose height is no greater than the height of (i). We can further apply the inductive
hypothesis on (ii) by replacing all occurrences of x with y, obtaining a derivation of
no greater height than (ii) (then, than (i)) of Γ [x/y], y A−→ z ⊢ ∆′[x/y], z : γ, from
which we conclude by an application of ( says R). 
We can also show that all the rules of SCondACL , with the exception of (EQ), are height-
preserving invertible.
Lemma 7 (Height-preserving invertibility of rules). Let Γ ⊢ ∆ be an instance of the
conclusion of a rule R of SCondACL , with R different from (EQ). If Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable,
then the premise(s) of R is (are) derivable with a derivation of (at most) the same height.
Proof. We have to consider each rule of the calculus. We distinguish between:
– rules (ATM ), (INT ), (→ L), ( says L), (MON ), (DT ), (ID), (CA), (CA −
conv), (C), (C4), (Unit), and (I): in these rules, the premises contain all formulas
of the respective conclusions. Therefore, we conclude that we have a proof (of no
greater height) of the premises since weakening is height-preserving admissible
(Lemma 5);
– all other rules, not copying their principal formulas in the premises. For each rule,
we proceed by induction on the height of the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆. We only present
the most interesting case of (→ R). The other cases are easier and left to the reader.
For the base case, suppose that Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α → β is an axiom: since axioms do
not involve complex formulas, we immediately conclude that also Γ, y ≥ x, y :
α ⊢ ∆′, y : β is an axiom, and we are done. For the inductive step, we distinguish
two subcases:
• the proof of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α → β is ended by an application of (→ R) to
x : α→ β, i.e. the proof is ended as follows:
(i) Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆′, z : β
(→ R)
Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α→ β
In this case, we immediately conclude, since we have a derivation of the premise
(i) of (→ R). Notice also that, if the height of the starting derivation is h, then
the height of the proof of (i) is h− 1;
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• the proof of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α → β is ended by an application of a rule (R’)
different from (→ R) or by (→ R) to a formula u : γ → δ ∈ ∆′: in this
case, we apply the inductive hypothesis on the premises, then we conclude
by an application of (R’). As an example, consider a derivation ended by an
application of ( says L) as follows:
(ii) Γ ′, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α→ β, x A−→ y (iii) Γ ′, x : A says γ, y : γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α→ β
( says L)
Γ
′
, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α→ β
We can apply the inductive hypothesys on (ii) and (iii), i.e. we have deriva-
tions (of at most the same height) of (ii′) Γ ′, x : A says γ, z ≥ x, z : α ⊢
∆′, x
A
−→ y, z : β and (iii′) Γ ′, x : A says γ, y : γ, z ≥ x, z : α ⊢ ∆′, z : β,
where (ii′) and (iii′) are, respectively, the premises of rule (→ R) applied to
(ii) and (iii). We conclude by an application of ( says L):
(ii′) Γ ′, x : A says γ, z ≥ x, z : α ⊢ ∆′, x A−→ y, z : β
(iii′) Γ ′, x : A says γ, y : γ, z ≥ x, z : α ⊢ ∆′, z : β
( says L)
(iv) Γ ′, x : A says γ, z ≥ x, z : α ⊢ ∆′, z : β
It is worth noticing that z does not occur in Γ ′ and∆′. Therefore, by Lemma 6
and (iv), we have a derivation (of at most the same height) of Γ ′, x : A says γ, y ≥
x, y : α ⊢ ∆′, y : β, which is the premise of the rule (→ R) applied to
Γ ′, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α→ β, and we are done. 
It is worth noticing that the height-preserving invertibility also preserves the number of
applications of the rules in a proof, that is to say: if Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 is derivable by Lemma
7 since it is the premise of a backward application of an invertible rule R to Γ2 ⊢ ∆2,
then it has a derivation containing the same rule applications of the proof of Γ2 ⊢ ∆2.
For instance, if (1) Γ, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ is derivable with a proof Π , then (2) Γ, x A−→
y, y : A ⊢ ∆ is derivable since (ID) is invertible; moreover, there exists a proof of
(2) containing the same rules of Π , obtained by adding y : A in each sequent of Π
from which (1) descends. This fact will be systematically used throughout this section,
in the sense that we will assume that every proof transformation due to the invertibility
preserves the number of rules applications in the initial proof.
We can show that the rules of contraction are admissibile in SCondACL .
Lemma 8 (Height-preserving and rule-preserving admissibility of contraction).
The rules of contraction are height-preserving admissible in SCondACL , i.e. if a sequent
Γ ⊢ ∆,F, F is derivable in SeqS, then there is a derivation of no greater height of
Γ ⊢ ∆,F , and if a sequent Γ, F, F ⊢ ∆ is derivable in SCondACL , then there is a
derivation of no greater height of Γ, F ⊢ ∆. Moreover, the rules of contraction are
rule-preserving admissibile in SCondACL , i.e. the proof of the contracted sequent does
not add any rule application to the initial proof.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the height of the drivations for left and right con-
traction. For the base case, let Γ ⊢ ∆,F, F be an axiom. We have the following sub-
cases:
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– F is either y ≥ x or x : P with P ∈ ATM and F ∈ Γ : in this case, we immediately
conclude that also Γ ⊢ ∆,F is an axiom;
– F is x ≥ x: again, also Γ ⊢ ∆,F is an instance of (AX≥) and we are done;
– x : ⊥ ∈ Γ : once again, also Γ ⊢ ∆,F is an instance of (AX⊥).
The other base case, namely the case where Γ, F, F ⊢ ∆ is an axiom, is symmetric.
For the inductive step, we consider the last rule applied to Γ ⊢ ∆,F, F (resp.
Γ, F, F ⊢ ∆). We distinguish three cases:
– the proof is ended by an application of (EQ): in this case, we can conclude since
(EQ) only involves two transition formulas, one on the left hand side and one
on the right hand side of the sequent. Even if F is a transition formula x A−→ y
involved in the application of (EQ), as follows:
u : A′ ⊢ u : A u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y, x
A
−→ y
the rule can be directly applied to the contracted sequent, and we are done:
u : A′ ⊢ u : A u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
– the applied rule is different from (EQ) and the contracted formula F is not prin-
cipal in the application of the rule: in this case, both occurrences of F are in the
premise(s) of the rule, which have a smaller derivation height. By the inductive
hypothesis, they can be contracted and the conclusion is obtained by applying the
rule to the contracted premise(s). As an example, consider a proof ended by an
application of (DT ) as follows:
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F, F, z : B Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆,F, F
(DT )
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F, F
We apply the inductive hypothesis on the two premises, then we conclude by an
application of (DT ):
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F, z : B Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆,F
(DT )
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F
– the applied rule is different from (EQ) and the contracted formula F is principal
in the application of the rule: we consider all the rules:
• (ATM ): the proof is ended as follows:
Γ
′
, x : P, x : P ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x Γ ′, x : P, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆
(ATM )
Γ
′
, x : P, x : P ⊢ ∆
We apply the inductive hypothesis on the premises, obtaining a proof of Γ ′, x :
P ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x and of Γ ′, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆, from which we conclude by an
application of (ATM );
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• (INT ), (MON), (DT ), (ID), (CA), (CA− conv), (C), (C4), (Unit), and
(I): in these cases, the proof is similar to the one proposed above for (ATM )
and then left to the reader;
• (∧L): the proof is ended as follows:
Γ, x : α, x : β, x : α ∧ β ⊢ ∆
(∧L)
Γ, x : α ∧ β, x : α ∧ β ⊢ ∆
Since (∧L) is height-preserving invertible (Lemma 7), we have a proof of at
most the same height of the premise of Γ, x : α, x : α, x : β, x : β ⊢ ∆.
We can apply the inductive hypothesis to obtain a proof (of no greater height)
of Γ, x : α, x : β, x : β ⊢ ∆, to which we can again apply the inductive
hypothesis to obtain a proof of Γ, x : α, x : β ⊢ ∆, from which we conclude
by an application of (∧L);
• (∧R): the proof is ended as follows:
(i) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α, x : α ∧ β (ii) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β, x : α ∧ β
(∧R)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α ∧ β, x : α ∧ β
By Lemma 7 and (i), we have a derivation of (i′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α, x : α and of
(i′′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α, x : β of at most the same height of (i). Similarly, we have
proofs of (ii′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β, x : α and (ii′′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β, x : β. We apply
the inductive hypothesis to (i′) and (ii′′), obtaining proofs of Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α
and Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β, respectively, from which we conclude by an application of
(∧R);
• (∨R) and (∨L): these cases are similar to the ones for (∧R) and (∧L) and
therefore left to the reader;
• (→ R): the proof is ended as follows:
Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆,x : α→ β, y : β
(→ R)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α→ β, x : α→ β
Since (→ R) is height-preserving invertible (Lemma 7), we have a derivation
of at most the same height of the premise of Γ, y ≥ x, z ≥ x, y : α, z : α ⊢
∆, y : β, z : β. y and z are new labels, not occurring in Γ and ∆. By the
height-preserving label substitution (Lemma 6), we replace the occurrences of
z with y to obtain a derivation of Γ, y ≥ x, y ≥ x, y : α, y : α ⊢ ∆, y :
β, y : β. We apply three times the inductive hypothesis, obtaining a derivation
of Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆, y : β, from which we conclude by an application of
(→ R);
• (→ L): the proof is ended as follows:
(i) Γ, x : α→ β, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
(ii) Γ, x : α→ β, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α
(iii) Γ, x : α→ β, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
(→ L)
Γ, x : α→ β, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆
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We can apply the inductive hypothesis on the three premises, obtaining deriva-
tions (of at most the same heights) of (i′) Γ, x : α → β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x,
(ii′) Γ, x : α → β ⊢ ∆, y : α , and (iii′) Γ, x : α → β, y : β ⊢ ∆,
from which we conclude by an application of (→ L);
• ( says R) and ( says L): these cases are similar to the ones for (→ R) and
(→ L), respectively, and left to the reader. 
We conclude this section by listing some lemmas and properties holding in SCondACL
that will be used to prove its soundness and completeness:
Lemma 9. A sequent ⊢ x : A→ B is derivable in SCondACL if and only if the sequent
x : A ⊢ x : B is derivable in SCondACL .
Proof. If x : A ⊢ x : B is derivable, then, by Lemma 5, also x ≥ u, x : A ⊢ x : B
is derivable. By an application of (→ R), we obtain a derivation of ⊢ u : A → B. By
Lemma 6 we conclude with a derivation of ⊢ x : A→ B.
If ⊢ x : A→ B is derivable, then we have also a derivation for u ≥ x, u : A ⊢ u : B
since (→ R) is invertible (Lemma 7). It can be observed that no rule of SCondACL
manipulate the label x, therefore the formula u ≥ x is useless. This means that there is
a derivation in SCondACL of u : A ⊢ u : B and, by Lemma 6, there is a derivation of
x : A ⊢ x : B. 
We can generalize axioms to a generic formula F , that is to say:
Proposition 4. Given any formulaF , the sequentΓ, F ⊢ ∆,F is derivable in SCondACL .
Proof. By induction on the complexity of F . For the base case, we have that F is either
x : P with P ∈ ATM or y ≥ x, then the sequent is an instance of (AX) and we are
done. For the inductive step, we distinguish two subcases:
– F has the form x A−→ y: by inductive hypothesis, u : A ⊢ u : A is derivable, then
we conclude that Γ, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y is derivable by an application of (EQ);
– F is a complex formula x : A⊗B, where⊗ stands for {→,∧,∨, says }. We only
present the most interesting cases of says and →, the other cases are similar and
left to the reader. Concerning says , there are derivations in SCondACL for (1) u :
A ⊢ u : A and (2) Γ, x : A says B, x A−→ y, y : B ⊢ ∆, y : B by inductive
hypothesis. We can conclude as follows:
(1) u : A ⊢ u : A (1) u : A ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ, x : A says B, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : B, x A−→ y (2) Γ, x : A says B, x A−→ y, y : B ⊢ ∆, y : B
( says L)
Γ, x : A says B, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : B
( says R)
Γ, x : A says B ⊢ ∆,x : A says B
Concerning →, again we apply the inductive hypothesis to prove that there are
derivations of (3) Γ, y ≥ x, x : A → B, y : A, y : B ⊢ ∆, y : B and (4) Γ, y ≥
x, x : A→ B, y : A ⊢ ∆, y : B, y : A. We conclude as follows:
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Γ, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, y : A ⊢ ∆, y : B, y ≥ x
(3) Γ, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, y : A, y : B ⊢ ∆, y : B
(4) Γ, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, y : A ⊢ ∆, y : B, y : A
(→ L)
Γ, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, y : A ⊢ ∆, y : B
(→ R)
Γ, x : A→ B ⊢ ∆,x : A→ B

Lemma 10. Given any formula γ ∈ L, the sequent Γ, y ≥ x, x : γ ⊢ ∆, y : γ is
derivable in SCondACL .
Proof. We consider all possible formulas γ ∈ L, starting with atomic ones γ = P ∈
ATM . The sequent y : P ⊢ y : P is an instance of (AX). Since weakening is admis-
sible (Lemma 5), we have that also (1) Γ, y ≥ x, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆, y : P is derivable.
The same for (1′) Γ, y ≥ x, x : P ⊢ ∆, y : P, y ≥ x, since y ≥ x ⊢ y ≥ x is an
instance of (AX). We conclude by an application of the rule (ATM ):
(1′) Γ, y ≥ x, x : P ⊢ ∆, y : P, y ≥ x (1) Γ, y ≥ x, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆, y : P
(ATM )
Γ, y ≥ x, x : P ⊢ ∆, y : P
For the complex formulas, we only present the most interesting cases of γ = A → B
and γ = A says B, the other cases are easy and left to the reader. By Proposition 4, we
have derivations for (2) v : A ⊢ v : A, (3) v : B ⊢ v : B, (4) z : B ⊢ z : B, and
(5) v ≥ x ⊢ v ≥ x, and, by Lemma 5, of (2′) Γ, v ≥ x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A → B, v :
A ⊢ v : B, v : A, (3′) Γ, v ≥ x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A → B, v : A, v : B ⊢ v : B,
(4′) Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z, x : A says B, z : B ⊢ ∆, z : B, and (5′) Γ, v ≥
x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, v : A ⊢ v : B, v ≥ x. We can conclude as follows:
(5′) Γ, v ≥ x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, v : A ⊢ v : B, v ≥ x
(2′) Γ, v ≥ x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, v : A ⊢ v : B, v : A
(3′) Γ, v ≥ x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, v : A, v : B ⊢ v : B
(→ L)
Γ, v ≥ x, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, v : A ⊢ v : B
(TR)
Γ, v ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : A→ B, v : A ⊢ v : B
(→ R)
Γ, y ≥ x, x : A→ B ⊢ ∆, y : A→ B
(2) v : A ⊢ v : A (2) v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z, x : A says B ⊢ ∆, z : B, x A−→ z (4′) Γ, y ≥ x, y A−→ z, x A−→ z, x : A says B, z : B ⊢ ∆, z : B
( says L)
Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z, x : A says B ⊢ ∆, z : B
(INT )
Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x : A says B ⊢ ∆, z : B
( says R)
Γ, y ≥ x, x : A says B ⊢ ∆, y : A says B

28 V. Genovese, L. Giordano, V. Gliozzi, G.L. Pozzato
Lemma 11. If Γ, x ≥ x ⊢ ∆ is derivable in SCondACL , then also Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable
with a derivation of at most the same height.
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation of Γ, x ≥ x ⊢ ∆. The base case is
easy, since axioms do not involve formulas x ≥ x in the left hand side of a sequent, with
the only exception of the case in which x ≥ x ∈ ∆: however, in this case, Γ ⊢ ∆ is an
instance of (AX≥) and we are done. For the inductive step, we have to consider all the
rules of SCondACL that can be applied to end the derivation of Γ, x ≥ x ⊢ ∆. To save
space, we only present the most interesting case of a proof ended with an application of
(TR) as follows:
Γ
′
, y ≥ x, y ≥ x, x ≥ x ⊢ ∆
(TR)
Γ
′
, y ≥ x, x ≥ x ⊢ ∆
By inductive hypothesis, there is a derivation of at most the same height of Γ ′, y ≥
x, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆, then, by Lemma 8, of Γ ′, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆, and we are done. The other cases
are similar and left to the reader. 
Lemma 12. If Γ ⊢ ∆,x : ⊥ is derivable in SCondACL , then also Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable.
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆,x : ⊥. The base case is
straighforward, since x : ⊥ in the right hand side of a sequent is involved in an axiom
only in case x : ⊥ ∈ Γ , however in this case we immediatley conclude that Γ ⊢ ∆ is
an instance of (AX⊥). For the inductive step, we just observe that all the rules except
(EQ) copy x : ⊥ in their premise(s), then we can conclude the proof by applying the
inductive hypothesis to such premise(s) and then reapplying the same rules. In case
the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆,x : ⊥ is ended by an application of (EQ) the proof is also
straightforward, since (EQ) is applied to transition formulas belonging to Γ and ∆,
therefore we have a proof of Γ ⊢ ∆ by an application of (EQ). 
5.2 Soundness and Completeness of SCondACL
Let us first prove that the calculus SCondACL is sound with respect to the semantics:
Theorem 8 (Soundness of SCondACL ). If a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable, then Γ ⊢ ∆ is
valid in the sense of Definition 7.
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆. The base cases are as
follows:
– Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of (AX), i.e. there is an F such that F ∈ Γ ∩ ∆. In this
case, given any modelM, if it satifies all the formulas in Γ , then it also satisfies F .
As a consequence, such model also satisfies at least a formula in ∆ (the formula F
itself), and the sequent is valid;
– Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of (AX⊥), i.e. x : ⊥ ∈ Γ : we immediately conclude that the
sequent is valid, since there is no model satifying x : ⊥;
– Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of (AX≥), i.e. x ≥ x ∈ ∆: in this case, given any model
M and any function I , since ≤ is reflexive, we have that I(x) ≤ I(x), then the
formula x ≥ x is satisfied in M via I and the sequent is valid.
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For the inductive step, we have the following cases (the list is exhaustive):
– the derivation of Γ ′, x : P ⊢ ∆ ends with an application of (ATM ), with P ∈
ATM . By inductive hypothesis, the premises Γ ′, x : P ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x and Γ ′, x :
P, y : P ⊢ ∆ are valid sequents. By absurd, suppose the conclusion is not, that is
to say there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′,
M |=I x : P (i.e. I(x) ∈ h(P )), whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. Since
Γ ′, x : P ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x is valid, we have that M |=I y ≥ x, i.e. I(x) ≤ I(y) and,
since I(x) ∈ h(P ) and P ∈ ATM , we have also that I(y) ∈ h(P ). Therefore,M
satisfies via I all formulas in the left hand side of the premise Γ ′, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆,
howeverM 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆, against its validity;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x : α ∧ β ⊢ ∆ ends with an application of (∧L): by inductive
hypothesis, the sequent Γ ′, x : α, x : β ⊢ ∆ is valid. By absurd, the conclusion is
not, i.e. there is a modelM and a function I such thatM |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′,
M |=I x : α ∧ β (i.e., I(x) ∈ [|α|] ∩ [|β|]), whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. It
immediately follows that M |=I x : α as well as M |=I x : β, so M |=I F for
every F in the left hand side of the premise, whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆,
against the validity of the premise itself;
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α ∧ β ends with an application of (∧R): by inductive
hypothesis, the sequents Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α and Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : β are valid. By absurd,
suppose that the conclusion Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α ∧ β is not valid, i.e. there is a modelM
and a function I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I G for any
G ∈ ∆ andM 6|=I x : α∧β, i.e. either I(x) 6∈ [|α|] or I(x) 6∈ [|β|]. If I(x) 6∈ [|α|],
we have that M satisfies via I all the formulas in the left hand side of the premise
Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α, whereas it falsifies all the formulas in its right hand side, against
the validity of such premise. Reasoning in the same way, in case I(x) 6∈ [|β|] we
contradict the hypothesis that Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : β is valid;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x : α ∨ β ⊢ ∆ ends with an application of (∨L): by inductive
hypothesis, the sequents Γ ′, x : α ⊢ ∆ and Γ ′, x : β ⊢ ∆ are valid. By absurd,
suppose that the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a modelM and a function I such that
M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′ andM |=I x : α∨ β, i.e. I(x) ∈ [|α|]∪ [|β|], whereas
M 6|=I G for anyG ∈ ∆. Since I(x) ∈ [|α|]∪[|β|], we have that either I(x) ∈ [|α|]
or I(x) ∈ [|β|]. In case I(x) ∈ [|α|], we have that M |=I x : α, however, this
contradicts the fact that the premise Γ ′, x : α ⊢ ∆ of (∨L) is valid, sinceM |=I F
for every F ∈ Γ ′ but M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. In case I(x) ∈ [|β|], we reason in
the same way and we contradict the fact that the premise Γ ′, x : β ⊢ ∆ of (∨L) is
valid;
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α ∨ β ends with an application of (∨R): by inductive
hypothesis, the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α, x : β is valid. By absurd, suppose that the
conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F
for every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆′ and M 6|=I x : α ∨ β,
i.e. I(x) 6∈ [|α ∨ β|], that is to say I(x) 6∈ [|α|] and I(x) 6∈ [|β|]. This contradicts
the validity of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α, x : β, since we have a model M and a function I
such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆′ and
M 6|=I x : α andM 6|=I x : β;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x : α → β ⊢ ∆ ends with an application of (→ L): by
inductive hypothesis, the premises (1) Γ ′, x : α → β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x, (2) Γ ′, x :
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α → β ⊢ ∆, y : α, and (3) Γ ′, x : α → β, y : β ⊢ ∆ are valid. By absurd, the
conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F for
every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x : α → β (i.e., I(x) ∈ [|α→ β|]), whereas M 6|=I G for
any G ∈ ∆′. By the validity of (1), we can conclude that also M |=I y ≥ x, i.e.
I(x) ≤ I(y). Similarly, by the validity of (2), we can conclude that M |=I y : α,
i.e. I(y) ∈ [|α|]. Since I(x) ≤ I(y), I(y) ∈ [|α|], and I(x) ∈ [|α→ β|], we have
that I(y) ∈ [|β|], i.e. M |=I y : β. Therefore, M satisfies, via I , all the formulas
in the left hand side of the premise (3), whereas it falsifies all the formulas in the
right hand side, against the hypothesis that (3) is valid;
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : α → β ends with an application of (→ R): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆′, y : β is valid. By absurd,
suppose that the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such
that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆ and M 6|=I
x : α → β, i.e. I(x) 6∈ [|α→ β|]. This means that there exists a world w such
that I(x) ≤ w and w ∈ [|α|], whereas w 6∈ [|β|]. Let us define a function I ′ such
that I ′(y) = w, whereas I ′(k) = I(k) for all labels k different from y. Since y is
a label not occurring in the conclusion, it immediately follows that M |=I′ F for
every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I′ G for any G ∈ ∆′. Furthermore, since I(x) ≤ w,
we have that M |=I′ y ≥ x and, since w ∈ [|α|], we have that M |=I′ y : α. From
the fact that w 6∈ [|β|], we also conclude that M 6|=I′ y : β, against the validity of
Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆′, y : β;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆ ends with an application of ( says L):
by inductive hypothesis, the premises (4) Γ ′, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y and
(5) Γ ′, x : A says γ, y : γ ⊢ ∆ are valid. By absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e.
there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′,
M |=I x : A says γ (i.e., for all w ∈ RA(I(x)) we have that w ∈ [|γ|]), whereas
M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. Since (4) is valid, we have that M |=I x
A
−→ y, that is
to say I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)). Therefore, since M |=I x : A says γ, we have that also
I(y) ∈ [|γ|]. We can conclude that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′ and M |=I y : γ,
but M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆ against the validity of (5);
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : A says γ ends with an application of ( says R): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆′, y : γ is valid. By absurd,
suppose that the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such
that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆ and M 6|=I
x : A says γ, i.e. I(x) 6∈ [|A says γ|]. This means that there exists a world w such
that I(x)RAw and w 6∈ [|γ|]. We define a function I ′ such that I ′(y) = w, whereas
I ′(k) = I(k) for all labels k different from y. Since y is a label not occurring in
the conclusion, it immediately follows that M |=I′ F for every F ∈ Γ , whereas
M 6|=I′ G for any G ∈ ∆′. Moreover, I(x)RAw means that M |=I′ x
A
−→ y,
as well as w 6∈ [|γ|] means that M 6|=I′ y : γ, against the validity of the premise
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, y : γ;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x B−→ y ends with an application of (EQ):
by inductive hypothesis, the premises u : A ⊢ u : B and u : B ⊢ u : A are
valid sequents. This means that, given any model M and any function I , we have
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that I(u) ∈ [|A|] if and only if I(u) ∈ [|B|], that is to say [|A|] = [|B|]. By the
condition (S-RCEA) in Definition 2, we have that also RA = RB . By absurd, the
conclusion is not valid, that is to say there is a model M and a function I such
that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x
A
−→ y (i.e. I(x)RAI(y)), whereas
M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆′ and M 6|=I x
B
−→ y (i.e. I(y) 6∈ RB(I(x))). The facts
that I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)) but I(y) 6∈ RB(I(x)) contradict the fact that RA = RB;
– the derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆ ends with an application of (TR): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, z ≥ x ⊢ ∆ is valid. By
absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that
M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I z ≥ y (i.e. I(y) ≤ I(z)), M |=I y ≥ x (i.e.
I(x) ≤ I(y)), whereasM 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. Since the relation ≤ is transitive,
it immediately follows that I(x) ≤ I(z), therefore M |=I z ≥ x, against the
validity of the premise;
– the derivation of Γ ′, y ≥ x, y A−→ z ⊢ ∆ is ended by an application of (INT ): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, y ≥ x, y A−→ z, x A−→ z ⊢ ∆ is valid. By
absurd, the conclusion is not, that is to say there is a modelM and a function I such
that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I y ≥ x (i.e. I(x) ≤ I(y)), M |=I y A−→ z
(i.e. I(y)RAI(z)), whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. By (S-Int) in Definition
2, from I(x) ≤ I(y) and I(y)RAI(z) it follows that I(x)RAI(z), therefore M
satisfies via I all the formulas in the left hand side of the premise, and none in the
right hand side, against its validity;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (ID): by inductive
hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, x A−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆ is a valid sequent. By absurd, the
conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F for
every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x
A
−→ y (i.e., I(x)RAI(y)), whereas M 6|=I G for any
G ∈ ∆. By (S-ID) in Definition 2, we have that, since I(x)RAI(y), it holds that
I(y) ∈ [|A|], against the validity of the premise;
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (CA): by inductive hypothesis,
the premises (i) Γ ⊢ ∆,x A∨B−→ y, (ii) Γ, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ and (iii) Γ, x B−→ y ⊢
∆ are valid sequents. By absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M
and a function I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I G for
any G ∈ ∆. Since (i) Γ ⊢ ∆,x A∨B−→ y is valid, we have that M |=I x
A∨B
−→
y, i.e. I(x)RA∨BI(y). By (S-CA) in Definition 2, we have that RA∨B(I(x)) =
RA(I(x)) ∪ RB(I(x)), then I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)) ∪ RB(I(x)), that is to say either
I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)) or I(y) ∈ RB(I(x)). Suppose I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)): in this case,
we have also that M |=I x
A
−→ y, against the validity of the premise (ii) Γ, x A−→
y ⊢ ∆. In case I(y) ∈ RB(I(x)), we conclude analogously against the validity of
(iii) Γ, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (CA − conv): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, x A∨B−→ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ is valid. By absurd,
the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F
for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x
A
−→ y (i.e., I(x)RAI(y)), whereas M 6|=I G for
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any G ∈ ∆. By (S-CA) in Definition 2, we have that RA∨B(I(x)) = RA(I(x)) ∪
RB(I(x)), then I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)) implies I(y) ∈ RA(I(x)) ∪ RB(I(x)), thus
I(y) ∈ RA∨B(I(x)). We conclude thatM |=I x
A∨B
−→ y, against the validity of the
premise;
– the derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (DT ): by
inductive hypothesis, the premises Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B and Γ ′, z ≥
y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆ are valid sequents. By absurd, the conclusion is not,
i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′,
M |=I z ≥ y (i.e. I(y) ≤ I(z)), M |=I x A−→ y (i.e., I(x)RAI(y)), whereas
M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. Since Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B is valid, it follows
that also M |=I z : B, that is to say I(z) ∈ [|B|]. By (S-DT) in Definition 2, from
I(x)RAI(y), I(y) ≤ I(z), and I(z) ∈ [|B|], it follows that also I(x)RA∧BI(z),
i.e. M |=I x
A∧B
−→ z, against the validity of the premise Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, x A∧B−→
z ⊢ ∆;
– the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (MON ): by inductive hypoth-
esis, the premises Γ ⊢ ∆,x A∧B−→ y and Γ, x A−→ y, x B−→ y ⊢ ∆ are valid.
By absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such
that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ , whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. Since the
premise Γ ⊢ ∆,x A∧B−→ y is valid, we have that also M |=I x
A∧B
−→ y, that is to
say I(x)RA∧BI(y). By (S-Mon) in Definition 2, we have that I(x)RAI(y) and
I(x)RBI(y), therefore M |=I x
A
−→ y and M |=I x
B
−→ y, against the validity
of the premise Γ, x A−→ y, x B−→ y ⊢ ∆.
– the derivation of Γ ′, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (Unit): by inductive
hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, x A−→ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆ is a valid sequent. By absurd,
the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such that M |=I F
for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x
A
−→ y (i.e., I(x)RAI(y)), whereas M 6|=I G for
any G ∈ ∆. By (S-UNIT) in Definition 2, we have that, since I(x)RAI(y), also
I(x) ≤ I(y), thenM |=I y ≥ x, against the validity of the premise;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x B−→ y, y A−→ z ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (I): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, x B−→ y, y A−→ z, x A−→ z ⊢ ∆ is a valid
sequent. By absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function
I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x
B
−→ y (i.e., I(x)RBI(y)),
M |=I y
A
−→ z (i.e., I(y)RAI(z)), whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. By (S-I) in
Definition 3, we have that, since I(x)RBI(y) and I(y)RAI(z), also I(x)RAI(z),
then M |=I x
A
−→ z, against the validity of the premise;
– the derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (C): by
inductive hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, z A−→ z ⊢ ∆ is a valid
sequent. By absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function
I such that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I z ≥ y (i.e., I(y) ≤ I(z)), and
M |=I x
A
−→ y (i.e., I(x)RAI(y)), whereasM 6|=I G for anyG ∈ ∆. By (S-C) in
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Definition 2, we have that, since I(x)RAI(y) and I(y) ≤ I(z), also I(z)RAI(z),
then M |=I z
A
−→ z, against the validity of the premise;
– the derivation of Γ ′, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆ ends by an application of (C4): by inductive
hypothesis, the premise Γ ′, x A−→ y, x A−→ z, z A−→ y ⊢ ∆ is a valid sequent.
By absurd, the conclusion is not, i.e. there is a model M and a function I such
that M |=I F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I x
A
−→ y (i.e., I(x)RAI(y)), whereas
M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆. By (S-C4) in Definition 3, since I(x)RAI(y), there
exists a worldw such that I(x)RAw andwRAI(y). Let us now consider a function
I ′ defined as follows: I ′(z) = w and I ′(k) = I(k) for all labels k 6= z. Since z
is a label not occurring in the conclusion of the rule, it immediately follows that
M |=I′ F for every F ∈ Γ ′, M |=I′ x
A
−→ y (since I ′(x) = I(x), I ′(y) = I(y)
and I(x)RAI(y)), M |=I′ x A−→ z (since I ′(z) = w and, as observed above,
I(x)RAw), M |=I′ z A−→ y (since wRAI(y)), whereas M 6|=I G for any G ∈ ∆,
against the validity of the premise. 
Completeness is an easy consequence of the admissibility of cut6. By cut we mean the
following rule:
Γ ⊢ ∆,F Γ, F ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
where F is any labelled formula. The standard proof of admissibility of cut proceeds
by a double induction over the complexity of F and the sum of the heights of the
derivations of the two premises of (cut), in the sense that we replace one cut by one
or several cuts on formulas of smaller complexity, or on sequents derived by shorter
derivations.
Theorem 9. If Γ ⊢ ∆,F and Γ, F ⊢ ∆ are derivable in SCondACL , so is Γ ⊢ ∆, i.e.
the rule (cut) is admissible in SCondACL .
Proof. By double induction on the complexity of the cut formula and on the sum of the
heights of the premises of the cut inference. To make the schema of the proof clear, we
define: cF as the complexity of F , i.e. cF = cp(F ); h1 as the height of the derivation
6 It is worth noticing that one can give a semantic proof of completeness, however as a difference
with modal logics, the proof is considerably more complex and require nonetheless the cut rule
(see [27] for a semantic completeness proof of a tableau calculus for the conditional logic CK).
We explain intuitively the difficulty. The usual way to prove completeness semantically is by
contraposition, that is to say to extract a counter model from a failed branch of a (suitable)
proof tree. To this purpose one needs to “saturate” a branch by applying the rules as much
as possible. However the model being constructed must satisfy the normality condition, i.e.
if [|A|] = [|A′|] then it must be RA = RA′ , or equivalently, the selection function must be
well-defined on arbitrary subsets of worlds. To ensure this property, a simple branch saturation
is not enough. One has to consider in the saturation process other formulas not occurring in the
branch and use inevitably the cut rule to make the whole construction work, the latter being a
kind of Henkin construction. For this reason we prefer the much simpler syntactic proof.
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of Γ ⊢ ∆,F ; h2 as the height of the derivation of Γ, F ⊢ ∆. For the base case of the
induction on the complexity of the cut formula, we consider the cases in which cF = 2
(its minimal value), namely the cases F = x : P with P ∈ ATM , F = x : ⊥, and
F = y ≥ x. Then, we fix cF and we prove the base case(s) for the induction on the
sum of the height of the premises, namely we prove the theorem for the cases in which
h1 = 0 or h2 = 0 (or both), i.e. (at least) one of the two premises is an axiom. For
the inductive steps, we replace the initial cut by one or more applications of cut either
(i) on formulas G such that cp(G) < cF , i.e. we apply the inductive hypothesis on
the complexity of the cut formula to prove that, if Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′, G and Γ ′, G ⊢ ∆′ are
derivable, so is Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′, or (ii) on the same formula F but cutting sequents Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′, F
and Γ ′, F ⊢ ∆′ whose derivations have heights h′1 and h′2 such that h′1 +h′2 < h1 +h2.
We analize each case in detail.
• Base case of the induction on the complexity cF of the cut formula: cF = 2. As
mentioned above, we consider three subcases: 1. the cut formula F is an order formula
y ≥ x; 2. the cut formula F is a world formula x : P where P is an atom (P ∈ ATM );
3. the cut formula F is x : ⊥.
1. We proceed by induction on the sum of the heights of the derivations of Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥
x and Γ, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆ to show that also Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable.
For the base of the induction, suppose that (at least) one of the premises of (cut)
is an instance of an axiom. For instance, assume that Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x is an axiom
(the other half is symmetric). We distinguish the following subcases: (i) u : ⊥ ∈ Γ ,
and we immediately conclude that also Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of (AX⊥); (ii) u ≥
u ∈ ∆, then we immediately get that also Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of (AX≥); (iii)
F ∈ Γ ∩∆, and obviously Γ ⊢ ∆ is an instance of (AX) too; (iv) y ≥ x ∈ Γ , i.e.
Γ = Γ ′, y ≥ x: in this case, the right premise of (cut) is Γ ′, y ≥ x, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆,
and we can conclude that also Γ ′, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆ is derivable since contraction is
admissible (Lemma 8).
For the inductive step, let us consider the last rule, say R, applied in the derivation
of Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x. We distinguish two subcases:
– the rule R is (EQ), i.e. the derivation is ended as follows:
u : A ⊢ u : A′ u : A′ ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, v
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆′, v
A
′
−→ z, y ≥ x
In this case, since order formulas do not play any role in an application of (EQ)
(only transition formulas are involved), we show that also Γ ⊢ ∆ = Γ ′, v A−→
z ⊢ ∆′, v
A′
−→ z is derivable by means of the following derivation:
u : A ⊢ u : A′ u : A′ ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, v
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆′, v
A
′
−→ z
– the rule R is different from (EQ): we just observe that no rule of SCondACL
has an order formula on the right hand side of a sequent as a principal formula.
Furthermore, in all the rules, y ≥ x is copied into the premise(s). Therefore,
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we can apply the inductive hypothesis on the sum of the heights of the premises
of (cut) to the sequent Γ, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆ and the premise(s) of Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x,
then we conclude by an application of R. As an example, consider the case R
is (ID), the other cases are similar and left to the reader. The derivation is as
follows:
(1) Γ ′, x
A
−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
(ID)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
Since weakening is height-preserving admissible (Lemma 5), since Γ ′, x A−→
y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆ is derivable, there is also a derivation, of at most the same height,
of (2) Γ ′, x A−→ y, y : A, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆. We can then apply the inductive hypoth-
esis on the sum of the heights to cut (1) and (2), and we obtain a derivation
also for Γ ′, x A−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆, from which we conclude by an application of
(ID).
2. As in the previous case, we proceed by induction on the sum of the heights of the
derivations of Γ ⊢ ∆,x : P and Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆.
For the base case, we have that (at least) one of the two sequents is an axiom,
suppose Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆ (the other half is symmetric). As in the previous case, the
proof is straightforward in cases u : ⊥ ∈ Γ , F ∈ Γ ∩ ∆ and u ≥ u ∈ ∆. In
case x : P ∈ ∆, i.e. ∆ = ∆′, x : P , we observe that the left premise of (cut) has
the form Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : P, x : P and, by contraction (Lemma 8), we conclude that
Γ ⊢ ∆′, x : P is derivable.
We proceed similarly to case 1 also for the inductive step. First of all, we consider
the rule R ending the derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆,x : P . We distinguish two cases:
– the rule R is (EQ), i.e. the derivation is ended as follows:
u : A ⊢ u : A′ u : A′ ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, v
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆′, v
A
′
−→ z, x : P
As we have done for the corresponding case in 1, we immediately get that
Γ ⊢ ∆ = Γ ′, v
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆′, v
A′
−→ z is derivable by an application of (EQ) to
u : A ⊢ u : A′ and u : A′ ⊢ u : A, since x : P does not play any role in the
application of (EQ), which involves only transition formulas;
– the rule R is different from (EQ): as in case 1, we just observe that no rule of
SCondACL has a formula x : P , where P is an atom, on the right hand side of
a sequent as a principal formula. Furthermore, in all the rules, x : P is copied
into the premise(s). We conclude exactly as we made in case 1, namely we
apply the inductive hypothesis on the sum of the heights of the premises to cut
Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆ and the premise(s) of Γ ⊢ ∆,x : P , then we conclude by an
application of R. As an example, consider the case R is (Unit), the other cases
are similar and left to the reader. The derivation is as follows:
(1) Γ ′, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x : P
(Unit)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x : P
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Since weakening is height-preserving admissible (Lemma 5), since Γ ′, x A−→
y, x : P ⊢ ∆ is derivable, we have a derivation of at most the same height
of (2) Γ ′, y ≥ x, x A−→ y, x : P ⊢ ∆. We apply the inductive hypothesis to
cut (1) and (2), then we obtain a derivation of Γ ′, y ≥ x, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, from
which we conclude by an application of (Unit).
3. In this case, since Γ ⊢ ∆,x : ⊥ is derivable, we immediately conclude that Γ ⊢ ∆
is derivable from Lemma 12.
• Base case of the induction on the sum of the heights of the premises of the cut
inference: (at least) one of the two premises of (cut) is an axiom. We have several
subcases: 1. F ∈ Γ ∩ ∆ or x : ⊥ ∈ Γ : in this case, it immediately follows that also
Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable and we are done. 2. Γ ⊢ ∆,F is an axiom since F = x ≥ x:
consider the other sequent Γ, x ≥ x ⊢ ∆. Since it is derivable, by Lemma 11, also
Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable, and we are done. 3. Γ ⊢ ∆,F is an axiom since F ∈ Γ , that
is to say Γ = Γ ′, F : in this case, the other premise of (cut) is Γ ′, F, F ⊢ ∆ and, by
Lemma 8, we can conclude that also Γ ′, F ⊢ ∆ is derivable, thus Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable,
and we are done. 4. Γ, F ⊢ ∆ is an axiom since F = x : ⊥: in this case, the other
premise corresponds to Γ ⊢ ∆,x : ⊥ and, by Lemma 12, we have that also Γ ⊢ ∆
is derivable. 5. Γ, F ⊢ ∆ is an axiom since F ∈ ∆, i.e. ∆ = ∆′, F : similarly to case
3, we have that the other premise corresponds to Γ ⊢ ∆′, F, F , and we conclude that
Γ ⊢ ∆′, F=Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable since contraction is admissible (Lemma 8).
• Inductive step: we distinguish the following two cases:
(case 1) the last step of one of the two premises is obtained by a rule in which F is
not the principal formula. We further distinguish two subcases: (i) one of the sequents,
say Γ, F ⊢ ∆ is obtained by the (EQ) rule, where F is not principal. The premises of
(EQ) do not contain F , since this rule only involves two transition formulas belonging
to Γ and∆. Therefore, we have a proof of Γ ⊢ ∆ by a direct application of (EQ) to it;
(ii) the sequent where F is not principal is derived by any rule R, except the (EQ) rule.
This case is standard, we can permute R over the cut, i.e. we cut the premise(s) of R
and then we apply R to the result of cut. We present two examples, namely the case in
which R is (DT ) applied to the left premise of (cut) and the case in which R is (Unit)
applied to the right premise of (cut). The other cases are very similar and left to the
reader. For (DT ), consider a derivation ending as follows:
(i) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F, z : B
(ii) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆,F
(DT )
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F (iii) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, F ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
By (iii) and Lemma 5, we have derivations of no greater heights of (iii′) Γ ′, z ≥
y, x
A
−→ y, F ⊢ ∆, z : B and (iii′′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, x A∧B−→ z, F ⊢ ∆. We can
apply the inductive hypothesis on the sum of the heights of the premises, namely we cut
(i) with (iii′) obtaining a derivation of (iv) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B, and we cut
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(ii) with (iii′′) obtaining a derivation of (v) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A−→ y, x A∧B−→ z ⊢ ∆. From
(iv) and (v) we conclude by an application of (DT ) as follows:
(iv) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B (v) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(DT )
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Notice that we have applied the inductive hypothesis on the height since the cut
formula is F itself. Concerning (Unit), consider a derivation ended as follows:
(i) Γ ′, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F
(ii) Γ ′, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y,F ⊢ ∆
(Unit)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y,F ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Since weakening is heigh-preserving admissible (Lemma 5), we have a derivation
of (i′) Γ ′, y ≥ x, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆,F . Also in this case, we apply the inductive hypothesis
on the height to cut (i′) and (ii), then we conclude by an application of (Unit):
(i′) Γ ′, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆,F (ii) Γ ′, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y,F ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(Unit)
Γ
′
, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(case 2) F is the principal formula in the last step of both derivations of the premises
of the cut inference. There are thirteen subcases: F is introduced a) by (∧R) - (∧L), b)
by (∨R) - (∨L), c) by (→ R) - (→ L), d) by ( says R) - ( says L), e) by (EQ) on the
left and on the right, f) by (EQ) on the left and by (Unit) on the right, g) by (EQ) on
the left and by (ID) on the right, h) by (EQ) on the left and by (C) on the right, i) by
(EQ) on the left and by (DT ) on the right, j) by (EQ) on the left and by (CA− conv )
on the right, k) by (EQ) on the left and by (C4) on the right, l) by (EQ) on the left
and by (I) on the right, m) by (EQ) on the left and by (INT ) on the right. The list is
exhaustive. Notice that the rules (CA) and (MON ) are not involved in any case, since
there is no principal formula F in their conclusions. The same for (TR) and (ATM ),
since there is no rule having a formula y ≥ x (respectively, x : P with P ∈ ATM )
on the right hand side of its conclusion as a principal formula. We present each case in
detail:
– a) We have the following derivation:
(1) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α (2) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β
(∧R)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α ∧ β
(3) Γ, x : α, x : β ⊢ ∆
(∧L)
Γ, x : α ∧ β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
Since weakening is admissible (Lemma 5), we have a derivation of no greater height
than (1) also for (1′) Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆,x : α. We conclude by applying two times the
inductive hypothesis, cutting formulas whose complexity is lower than the one of
x : α ∧ β, as follows:
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(2) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β
(1′) Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆,x : α (3) Γ, x : α, x : β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
– b) We have the following derivation:
(1) Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α, x : β
(∨R)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α ∨ β
(2) Γ, x : α ⊢ ∆ (3) Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆
(∨L)
Γ, x : α ∨ β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
By weakening (Lemma 5), we have a derivation of (2′) Γ, x : α ⊢ ∆,x : β of
no greater height than (2). As in case a), we conclude by applying two times the
inductive hypothesis on the complexity of the cut formula, replacing the initial cut
as follows:
(1) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α, x : β (2′) Γ, x : α ⊢ ∆,x : β
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : β (3) Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
– c) We have the following derivation:
(1) Γ, z ≥ x, z : α ⊢ ∆, z : β
(→ R)
(5) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α→ β
(2) Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
(3) Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α
(4) Γ, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
(→ L)
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
First, observe that the label z in the premise of (→ R) is new, i.e. it does not occur
in the conclusion of such rule. By Lemma 6, we have a derivation of no greater
height than (1) also of (1′) Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆, y : β. Since weakening is height-
preserving admissibile, we have derivations for (5′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α → β, y ≥ x,
(5′′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α → β, y : α, and (5′′′) Γ, y : β ⊢ ∆,x : α → β, whose heights
are no greater than the height of (5). By applying the inductive hypothesis on the
height of the derivations, we can cut (2) and (5′), obtaining a derivation of (6) Γ ⊢
∆, y ≥ x, (3) and (5′′), obtaining a derivation of (7) Γ ⊢ ∆, y : α, (3) and (5′′′),
obtaining a derivation of (8) Γ, y : β ⊢ ∆. By weakening (Lemma 5), we have also
derivations of (7′) Γ, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆, y : α and (8′) Γ, y ≥ x, y : α, y : β ⊢ ∆. We
replace the initial cut with three cuts on formulas whose complexity is lower than
the one of x : α→ β, as follows:
(6) Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
(7′) Γ, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆, y : α
(1′) Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆, y : β
(8′) Γ, y ≥ x, y : α, y : β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
Logics in Access Control: A Conditional Approach 39
– d) We have the following derivation:
(1) Γ, x
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆, z : γ
( says R)
(4) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : A says γ
(2) Γ, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y (3) Γ, x : A says γ, y : γ ⊢ ∆
( says L)
Γ, x : A says γ ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
First, observe that, since the label z does not occur in the conclusion of ( says R),
by Lemma 6 we have a derivation of (1′) Γ, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : γ. By weaken-
ing (Lemma 5), we have derivations of (4′) Γ ⊢ ∆,x : A says γ, x A−→ y and
(4′′) Γ, y : γ ⊢ ∆,x : A says γ, whose heights are no greater than the one for (4).
We apply the inductive hypothesis on the height of the derivations to cut (2) and
(4′), obtaining (5) Γ ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y, and to cut (3) with (4′′), obtaining (6) Γ, y :
γ ⊢ ∆. By Lemma 5 we have also a derivation for (6′) Γ, x A−→ y, y : γ ⊢ ∆. We
conclude as follows by applying two times the inductive hypothesis on the com-
plexity of the cut formula:
(5) Γ ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
(1′) Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : γ (6′) Γ, x
A
−→ y, y : γ ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ ⊢ ∆
– e) We have the following derivation:
(1) u : B ⊢ u : A (2) u : A ⊢ u : B
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
C
−→ y, x
A
−→ y
(3) u : A ⊢ u : C (4) u : C ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
B
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
C
−→ y
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
C
−→ y
By Lemma 5, from (1) we obtain a proof of (1′) u : B ⊢ u : A, u : C, from (2) we
obtain a proof of (2′) u : A, u : C ⊢ u : B, from (3) we obtain a proof of (3′) u :
A, u : B ⊢ u : C, and from (4) we obtain a proof of (4′) u : C ⊢ u : A, u : B.
We replace the initial cut with the following derivation, where (cut) is eliminable
by applying the inductive hypothesis on the complexity of the cut formula:
(1′) u : B ⊢ u : A, u : C
(3′) u : A, u : B ⊢ u : C
(cut)
u : B ⊢ u : C
(2′) u : A, u : C ⊢ u : B
(4′) u : C ⊢ u : A, u : B
(cut)
u : C ⊢ u : B
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
C
−→ y
– f) The derivation is ended as follows:
u : A ⊢ u : A′ u : A′ ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
(2) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
(1) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
(Unit)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
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By Lemma 5, we have a derivation of height no greater than (2) of (2′) Γ ′, x A
′
−→
y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y. We can replace the initial cut by applying the inductive
hypothesis on the height of the derivations to cut (2′) and (1) as follows:
(2′) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y (1) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
(Unit)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
– g) The derivation we are considering is as follows:
u : A ⊢ u : A′ (1) u : A′ ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
(3) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
(2) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆
(ID)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
First of all, by the height-preserving admissibility of label substitution (Lemma 6),
we have a derivation of no greater height of (1) for (1′) y : A′ ⊢ y : A. Moreover,
by weakening (Lemma 5), we have derivations for (3′) Γ ′, x A
′
−→ y, y : A, y :
A′ ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y of no greater height with respect to (3), for (2′) Γ ′, x A
′
−→
y, x
A
−→ y, y : A, y : A′ ⊢ ∆ of no greater height with respect to (2), and of
(1′′) Γ ′, x
A′
−→ y, y : A′ ⊢ ∆, y : A of no greater height with respect to (1′). We
can conclude by replacing the initial cut by the two following cuts:
(1′′) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, y : A′ ⊢ ∆, y : A
(3′) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, y : A, y : A′ ⊢ ∆, x
A
−→ y
(2′) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y : A, y : A′ ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, y : A, y : A′ ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, y : A′ ⊢ ∆
(ID)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
The upper cut (between (3′) and (2)) can be eliminated by applying the inductive
hypothesis on the height of the premises, whereas the lower one can be removed by
applying the inductive hypothesis on the complexity of the cut formula.
– h) We have the following derivation:
(I) u : A′ ⊢ u : A (II) u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
(1) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, z
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(C)
(2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
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This case is more complicated: intuitively, we cannot conclude as in the previous
case g) by cutting (1) and the conclusion of (EQ) (and using necessary weaken-
ings), because of the presence of z A−→ z. More precisely, the application of the
inductive hypothesis on the sum of the heights of the derivations would lead to a
derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y, z
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆, from which we are not able to
conclude.
In order to tackle this problem, we first show that the sequent (2′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→
y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is derivable, that is to say we replaceAwith the equivalent formula
A′ in one or more transition formulas7 in (2), since (I) and (II) are derivable.
Given this, we immediately conclude that Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is derivable
since contraction is admissible (Lemma 8). We proceed by induction on the height
of the derivation of (2). The base case corresponds to the situation in which (2) is
an instance of the axioms: since axioms do not involve transition formulas, we can
easily observe that either there is a formulaG such that G ∈ Γ ′ ∩∆ or z ≥ y ∈ ∆
or, for some w, w : ⊥ ∈ Γ ′ or w ≥ w ∈ ∆. In all these cases, it immediately
follows that also (2′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is an axiom and we are
done. For the inductive step, we consider each rule ending the derivation of (2). We
distinguish two subcases:
• the derivation of (2) is ended by an application of (EQ) as follows:
(III) u : A ⊢ u : B (IV ) u : B ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
(2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
B
−→ y
Since weakening is admissible (Lemma 5), from (I) we obtain a derivation of
(I ′) u : A′ ⊢ u : A, u : B, from (II) we obtain a proof of (II ′) u : B, u : A ⊢
u : A′, from (III) we obtain a proof of (III ′) u : A, u : A′ ⊢ u : B and from
(IV ) we obtain a proof of (IV ′) u : B ⊢ u : A, u : A′. We conclude that (2′)
is derivable as follows:
(I ′) u : A′ ⊢ u : A, u : B
(III ′) u : A,u : A′ ⊢ u : B
(cut)
u : A′ ⊢ u : B
(IV ′) u : B ⊢ u : A,u : A′
(II ′) u : B, u : A ⊢ u : A′
(cut)
u : B ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
(2′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆′, x
B
−→ y
Notice that the two cuts can be eliminated by applying the inductive hypothesis
on the complexity of the cut formula: indeed, the cut formula is u : A, whose
complexity is lower than the one of x A−→ y;
• the derivation of (2) is ended by an application of (ID) as follows:
(3) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆
(ID)
(2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
7 In the general case, transition formulas can have the following forms: u A−→ v, u A∨B−→ v,
u
A∧B
−→ v.
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First of all, we apply the inductive hypothesis to replace A with A′ in (3),
obtaining a proof of (3′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆, then,
by Lemma 5, we have a proof also for (3′′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, y : A′, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→
y, y : A ⊢ ∆. By Lemma 6 and weakening (Lemma 5), from (I) u : A′ ⊢ u : A
we obtain a proof of (I ′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, y : A′, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : A. We
apply the inductive hypothesis of cut to (3′′) and (I ′), again on the complexity
of the cut formula which is y : A, whose complexity is lower than the one of
x
A
−→ y. We obtain a derivation of Γ ′, z ≥ y, y : A′, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,
from which we conclude by an application of (ID);
• the derivation of (2) is ended by an application of (DT ) as follows:
(3) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B (4) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(DT )
(2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
First of all, we show that u : A ∧B ⊢ u : A′ ∧B and u : A′ ∧B ⊢ u : A ∧B
are derivable. Indeed, by Lemma 5, from (I) and (II) we have derivations for
(I ′) u : A′, u : B ⊢ u : A and (II ′) u : A, u : B ⊢ u : A′. Moreover,
(5) u : A, u : B ⊢ u : B and (6) u : A′, u : B ⊢ u : B are derivable (they
are instances of the axiom (AX)), from which we can build the following
derivations:
(II ′) u : A,u : B ⊢ u : A′ (5) u : A, u : B ⊢ u : B
(∧R)
u : A, u : B ⊢ u : A′ ∧ B
(∧L)
u : A ∧B ⊢ u : A′ ∧B
(I ′) u : A′, u : B ⊢ u : A (6) u : A′, u : B ⊢ u : B
(∧R)
u : A′, u : B ⊢ u : A ∧ B
(∧L)
u : A′ ∧ B ⊢ u : A ∧B
Therefore, we can apply the inductive hypothesis to (3), obtaining a proof of
(3′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B, as well as to (4) to obtain a proof
of (4′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y, x
A′∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆. We immediately conclude
by an application of (DT ) to (3′) and (4′);
• the derivation of (2) is ended by an application of (CA− conv) as follows:
(3) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∨B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(CA− conv)
(2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Similarly to the case of (DT ), we observe that also u : A∨B ⊢ u : A′∨B and
u : A′ ∨B ⊢ u : A ∨B are derivable, then we apply the inductive hypothesis
on (3) to obtain a proof of Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y, x
A′∨B
−→ z ⊢ ∆, from
which we conclude by an application of (CA− conv);
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• the last rule in the derivation of (2) is different from (EQ), (ID), (DT ) and
(CA − conv): in all these cases, the transition formula x A−→ y is copied
into the premise(s). We can immediately conclude by first applying the induc-
tive hypothesis, i.e. by replacing A with A′, in such premise(s), and then by
applying the same rule. As an example, let us consider a proof ended by an
application of (C4) as follows:
(3) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A
−→ w,w
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(C4)
(2) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
We can apply the inductive hypothesis on (3) to obtain a derivation of (3′) Γ ′, z ≥
y, x
A′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ w,w
A′
−→ z ⊢ ∆, from which we conclude by an
application of (C4).
– i) The derivation is as follows:
(1) u : A′ ⊢ u : A (2) u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, z : B
Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(DT )
(3) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, z ≥ y, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Since (1) u : A′ ⊢ u : A and (2) u : A ⊢ u : A′ are derivable, we can prove that
also (3′) Γ ′, z ≥ y, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is derivable. The proof is by induction
on the height of the derivation of (3), is exactly the same as the one proposed for
case h) and it is therefore omitted. Since contraction is admissible (Lemma 8), we
can immediately conclude from (3′).
– j) We have the following derivation:
u : A′ ⊢ u : A u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A∨B
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(CA− conv)
(1) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
We proceed as in the previous cases h) and i) to prove that we have a derivation of
(1′) Γ ′, x
A′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆. Since contraction is admissible (Lemma 8), we
conclude that also Γ ′, x A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is derivable.
– k) We are considering the following derivation:
u : A′ ⊢ u : A u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, x
A
−→ z, z
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(C4)
(1) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
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Also in this case we proceed similarly to what done for cases h), i) and j): by
induction on the height of the derivation of (1), we prove that there is a derivation
of Γ ′, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆, then we conclude by contraction (Lemma 8) that
Γ ′, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is derivable.
– l) We have the following derivation:
u : A′ ⊢ u : A u : A ⊢ u : A′
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, y
B
−→ z ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y
B
−→ z, x
B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(I)
(1) Γ ′, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, y
B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x
A
′
−→ y, y
B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
As in the previous cases, we first show that (1′) Γ ′, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y, y
B
−→ z ⊢ ∆
is derivable; again, the proof is by induction on the height of the derivation of (1)
and it makes use of the inductive hypothesis of cut on the complexity of the cut
formula. We then conclude by contraction (Lemma 8) that Γ ′, x A
′
−→ y, y
B
−→ z ⊢
∆ is derivable.
– m) We have the following derivation:
u : A ⊢ u : A′ u : A′ ⊢ u : A
(EQ)
Γ
′
, x ≥ z, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆,x
A
−→ y
Γ
′
, x ≥ z, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y, z
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(INT )
(1) Γ ′, x ≥ z, x
A
′
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ
′
, x ≥ z, x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
As in the previous cases, we first show that (1′) Γ ′, x ≥ z, x A
′
−→ y, x
A′
−→ y ⊢ ∆
is derivable, then we conclude that Γ ′, x ≥ z, x A
′
−→ y ⊢ ∆ is also derivable since
contraction is admissible (Lemma 8). 
It is worth noticing that in the proof of Theorem 9 above, in cases h), i), j), k), l), and
m), it is needed a property that, given that u : A ⊢ u : A′ and u : A′ ⊢ u : A are
derivable, allows us to replace A with A′ in one or more transition formulas x A−→
y (resp. x A∨B−→ y or x A∧B−→ y) in a derivable sequent Γ ⊢ ∆. The proof of such
property in turn requires (cut) (see case h) as an example). As an alternative to the
proof presented above, in order to prove the admissibility of cut for SCondACL , we can
proceed as done in [28] to deal with conditional logics containing the axiom (CEM) of
conditional excluded middle. Let Γ [xi
F
−→ yi] ⊢ ∆[uj
F
−→ vj ] be a sequent containing
any number of transitions labelled with the formula F , where F is either A or A ∧ B
or A ∨ B; moreover, if u : A ⊢ u : A′ and u : A′ ⊢ u : A are derivable, we denote
with Γ ⋆ ⊢ ∆⋆ the sequent obtained by replacing any number of transitions labelled
with either A or A ∧ B or A ∨ B with the same transitions where A is replaced by A′
in Γ [xi
F
−→ yi] ⊢ ∆[uj
F
−→ vj ]. We can prove that cut is admissible by “splitting” the
notion of cut in two propositions:
Logics in Access Control: A Conditional Approach 45
– (A) If Γ ⊢ ∆,F and Γ, F ⊢ ∆ are derivable, so is Γ ⊢ ∆, i.e. the rule (cut) is
admissible in SCondACL ;
– (B) if (I) Γ [xi F−→ yi] ⊢ ∆[uj F−→ vj ] , (II) u : A ⊢ u : A′ and (III) u : A′ ⊢ u : A
are derivable, then Γ ⋆ ⊢ ∆⋆ is derivable.
The proof is by mutual induction between (A) and (B). The induction on (A) is, as in
the proof of Theorem 9 above, a double induction on the complexity of the cut formula
and on the sum of the heights of the premises of (cut), whereas the induction on (B) is
on the height of the derivation of (I). To prove (A) in the above mentioned cases from h)
to m), we need to apply the inductive hypothesis on (B) to one of the premises of (cut),
and this is allowed since the height of such premise (say h2) is lower than h1 + h2. To
prove (B), in case the derivation of (I) Γ [xi F−→ yi] ⊢ ∆[uj F−→ vj ] is ended by an
application of either (EQ) or (ID), we need to apply the inductive hypothesis on (A)
on the complexity of the cut formulas, and this is allowed since the cut formulas are
subformulas of the initial x F−→ y.
Now we can prove the completeness of the calculus SCondACL :
Theorem 10 (Completeness of SCondACL ). If a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is valid in the sense of
Definition 7, then Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable.
Proof. We have to prove that the axioms are derivable and that the set of derivable
formulas is closed under (MP), (RCEA), and (RCK).
First, we show a derivation in SCondACL of the axioms:
– (FALSE)
x ≥ u, x : ⊥ ⊢ x : γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : ⊥ → γ
– (THEN-1): by Lemma 10, we have that, given any formula α, there is a derivation
in SCondACL for (i) y ≥ x, x ≥ u, y : β, x : α ⊢ y : α. We can conclude as
follows:
(i) y ≥ x, x ≥ u, y : β, x : α ⊢ y : α
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x : α ⊢ x : β → α
(→ R)
⊢ u : α→ (β → α)
– (THEN-2)
. . . , z ≥ y ⊢ z ≥ y, . . .
. . . , z : α ⊢ . . . , z : α
. . . , z ≥ x ⊢ z ≥ x, . . .
. . . , z : α ⊢ . . . , z : α
. . . ⊢ z ≥ z, . . .
z : β, . . . ⊢ z : β, . . .
z : γ, . . . ⊢ z : γ, . . .
(→ L)
. . . , z : β → γ, z : β, z : α ⊢ . . . , z : γ
(→ L)
z ≥ x, . . . , z : α, z : β, x : α→ (β → γ) ⊢ . . . , z : γ
(→ L)
z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α→ (β → γ), y : α→ β, z : α ⊢ z : γ
(TR)
z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α→ (β → γ), y : α→ β, z : α ⊢ z : γ
(→ R)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α→ (β → γ), y : α→ β ⊢ y : α→ γ
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x : α→ (β → γ) ⊢ x : (α→ β) → (α→ γ)
(→ R)
⊢ u : (α→ (β → γ)) → ((α→ β) → (α→ γ))
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– (AND-1), (AND-2) (the two cases are symmetric)
x ≥ u, x : α, x : β ⊢ x : α
(∧L)
x ≥ u, x : α ∧ β ⊢ x : α
(→ R)
⊢ u : α ∧ β → α
– (AND-3): by Lemma 10, we have a derivation for (ii) y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α, y : β ⊢
y : α, from which we conclude as follows:
(ii) y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α, y : β ⊢ y : α y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α, y : β ⊢ y : β
(∧R)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α, y : β ⊢ y : α ∧ β
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x : α ⊢ x : β → (α ∧ β)
(→ R)
⊢ u : α→ (β → (α ∧ β))
– (OR-1), (OR-2) (the two cases are symmetric)
x ≥ u, x : α ⊢ x : α, x : β
(∨R)
x ≥ u, x : α ⊢ x : α ∨ β
(→ R)
⊢ u : α→ α ∨ β
– (OR-3)
z ≥ y, . . . z ≥ y, z : β
. . . , z : β ⊢ z : β
. . . z ≥ x ⊢ . . . , z ≥ x
. . . , z : α ⊢ . . . , z : α
. . . , z : β ⊢ . . . , z : β
(→ L)
z ≥ x, x : α→ β, . . . , z : α ⊢ z : γ, z : β
(TR)
z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : α→ β, . . . , z : α ⊢ z : γ, z : β . . . , z : γ ⊢ z : γ, z : β
(∨L)
z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x : α→ β, . . . , z : α ∨ γ ⊢ z : γ, z : β
(→ L)
z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α→ β, y : γ → β, z : α ∨ γ ⊢ z : β
(→ R)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : α→ β, y : γ → β ⊢ y : α ∨ γ → β
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x : α→ β ⊢ x : (γ → β) → (α ∨ γ → β)
(→ R)
⊢ u : (α→ β) → ((γ → β) → (α ∨ γ → β))
– (K)
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v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , y
A
−→ z ⊢ z : β, y
A
−→ z
v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , x
A
−→ z ⊢ x
A
−→ z, z : β
. . . ⊢ z : β, z ≥ z
. . . , z : α ⊢ z : β, z : α
. . . , z : β ⊢ z : β
(→ L)
. . . , z : α→ β, z : α ⊢ z : β
( says L)
x
A
−→ z, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x : A says (α→ β), z : α, . . . ⊢ z : β
(INT )
y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x : A says (α→ β), z : α, . . . ⊢ z : β
( says L)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, y
A
−→ z, x : A says (α→ β), y : A says α ⊢ z : β
( says R)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : A says (α→ β), y : A says α ⊢ y : A says β
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x : A says (α→ β) ⊢ x : A says α→ A says β
(→ R)
⊢ u : A says (α→ β) → (A says α→ A says β)
– (CA): let us first observe that, since A ∨ B occurs in the left hand side of says in
the initial formula, we have that A ∨B ∈ LP. We have the following derivation:
v : A ⊢ v : A, v : B
v : B ⊢ v : A, v : B
(∨L)
v : A ∨ B ⊢ v : A, v : B
(∨R)
v : A ∨ B ⊢ v : A ∨B
(EQ)
. . . , x
A∨B
−→ y ⊢ y : γ, x
A∨B
−→ y
v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . x
A
−→ y . . . , y : γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
. . . , x
A
−→ y, x : A says γ ⊢ y : γ
v : B ⊢ v : B
(EQ)
. . . x
B
−→ y . . . , y : γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
. . . , x
B
−→ y, x : B says γ ⊢ y : γ
(CA)
x ≥ u, x
A∨B
−→ y, x : A says γ, x : B says γ ⊢ y : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ, x : B says γ ⊢ x : A ∨ B says γ
(∧L)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ ∧ B says γ ⊢ x : A ∨B says γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : A says γ ∧ B says γ → A ∨ B says γ
– (CA-conv): similarly to the case of (CA), we observe that A ∨ B ∈ LP. We have
the following derivation:
v : A ∨ B ⊢ v : A ∨B
(EQ)
. . . , x
A∨B
−→ y ⊢ y : γ, x
A∨B
−→ y . . . , y : γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x
A∨B
−→ y, x : A ∨ B says γ ⊢ y : γ
(CA− conv)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A ∨B says γ ⊢ y : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A ∨B says γ ⊢ x : A says γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : A ∨ B says γ → A says γ
48 V. Genovese, L. Giordano, V. Gliozzi, G.L. Pozzato
– (Mon): similarly to the cases of (CA) and (CA-conv), we observe thatA∧B ∈ LP.
We have the following derivation:
v : A, v : B ⊢ v : A
v : A, v : B ⊢ v : B
(∧R)
v : A, v : B ⊢ v : A ∧B
(∧L)
v : A ∧ B ⊢ v : A ∧B
(EQ)
. . . , x
A∧B
−→ y ⊢ y : γ, x
A∧B
−→ y
v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : γ, x
A
−→ y . . . , y : γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
. . . , x
A
−→ y, x
B
−→ y, x : A says γ ⊢ y : γ
(MON)
x ≥ u, x
A∧B
−→ y, x : A says γ ⊢ y : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ ⊢ x : A ∧B says γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : A says γ → A ∧B says γ
– (DT): similarly to the case of (Mon), we observe that A ∧ B ∈ LP. We have the
following derivation:
. . . , z : B ⊢ z : γ, z : B
v : A ∧ B ⊢ v : A ∧B
(EQ)
. . . , x
A∧B
−→ z ⊢, z : γ, x
A∧B
−→ z . . . , z : γ ⊢ z : γ
( says L)
. . . , x
A∧B
−→ z, x : A ∧B says γ ⊢ z : γ
(DT )
z ≥ y, x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A ∧B says γ, z : B ⊢ z : γ
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A ∧B says γ ⊢ y : B → γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A ∧B says γ ⊢ x : A says (B → γ)
(→ R)
⊢ u : A ∧ B says γ → (A says (B → γ))
– (ID)
x
A
−→ y, y : A ⊢ y : A
(ID)
x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : A
( says R)
⊢ x : A says A
– (UNIT): by Lemma 10 we have a derivation in SCondACL of (iii) y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x :
γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : γ, from which we conclude as follows:
(iii) y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : γ
(Unit)
x ≥ u, x : γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : γ ⊢ x : A says γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : γ → (A says γ)
– (I)
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v : A ⊢ v : A v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , x
A
−→ z ⊢ z : γ, x
A
−→ z . . . , z : γ ⊢ z : γ
( says L)
x ≥ u, x
B
−→ y, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z, x : A says γ ⊢ z : γ
(I)
x ≥ u, x
B
−→ y, y
A
−→ z, x : A says γ ⊢ z : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x
B
−→ y, x : A says γ ⊢ y : A says γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ ⊢ x : B says (A says γ)
(→ R)
⊢ u : (A says γ) → (B says A says γ)
– (C)
v : A ⊢ v : A v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , z
A
−→ z ⊢ z : γ, z
A
−→ z . . . , z : γ ⊢ z : γ
( says L)
z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, z
A
−→ z, z : A says γ ⊢ z : γ
(C)
z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, z : A says γ ⊢ z : γ
(→ R)
x
A
−→ y ⊢ y : (A says γ) → γ
( says R)
⊢ x : A says (A says γ → γ)
– (C4)
v : A ⊢ v : A v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , x
A
−→ z ⊢ y : γ, x
A
−→ z
v : A ⊢ v : A v : A ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
. . . , z
A
−→ y ⊢ y : γ, z
A
−→ y . . . , y : γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
. . . , z
A
−→ y, z : A says γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x
A
−→ z, z
A
−→ y, x : A says (A says γ) ⊢ y : γ
(C4)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A says (A says γ) ⊢ y : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says (A says γ) ⊢ x : A says γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : (A says (A says γ)) → (A says γ)
Let us now show that the set of derivable formulas is closed under (MP), (RCEA),
and (RCK). For (MP), suppose we have a derivation for (iv) ⊢ x : α and (v) ⊢ x :
α → β. Since weakening is admissible, we have that also (iv′) ⊢ x : α, x : β and
(v′) x : α ⊢ x : α→ β, x : β have a derivation in SCondACL . Since (cut) is admissible,
we can conclude that ⊢ x : β is derivable as follows:
(iv′) ⊢ x : α, x : β
(v′)x : α ⊢ x : α→ β, x : β
x : α→ β, x : α ⊢ x : β, x ≥ x
x : α→ β, x : α ⊢ x : β, x : α
x : α→ β, x : α, x : β ⊢ x : β
(→ L)
x : α→ β, x : α ⊢ x : β
(cut)
x : α ⊢ x : β
(cut)
⊢ x : β
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For (RCEA), we proceed as follows. As usual, ⊢ A ↔ B is a shorthand for ⊢ A → B
and ⊢ B → A. Suppose we have a derivation for ⊢ v : A → B and for ⊢ v : B → A.
By Lemma 9, we have also derivations for v : A ⊢ v : B and v : B ⊢ v : A. The
following derivation shows that also ⊢ u : (A says γ) → (B says γ) is derivable in
SCondACL (the other half is symmetric):
v : A ⊢ v : B v : B ⊢ v : A
(EQ)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ, x B−→ y ⊢ y : γ, x A−→ y . . . , y : γ ⊢ y : γ
( says L)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ, x B−→ y ⊢ y : γ
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says γ ⊢ x : B says γ
(→ R)
⊢ u : (A says γ) → (B says γ)
For (RCK), suppose there is a derivation for ⊢ y : α→ β. By Lemma 9, there is also a
derivation for (vi) y : α ⊢ y : β and, by weakening, of (vi′) x ≥ u, x : A says α, x A−→
y, y : α ⊢ y : β, from which we conclude:
. . . x
A
−→ y ⊢ x
A
−→ y, . . . (vi′) x ≥ u, x : A says α, x A−→ y, y : α ⊢ y : β
( says L)
x ≥ u, x : A says α, x A−→ y ⊢ y : β
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says α ⊢ x : A says β
(→ R)
⊢ u : (A says α) → (A says β)

Completeness of SCondACL with respect to the models of the respective logic in Defi-
nitions 2 and 3 immediately follows from the completeness of the axiomatization with
respect to the semantics, shown in Theorems 4, 5, 6, and 7. We have that a formula
ϕ ∈ L is valid if and only if the sequent ⊢ u : ϕ has a derivation in SCondACL .
5.3 Decidability and complexity of CondUCACL
In this section we focus on the logic CondUCACL , for which we are able to describe a
decision procedure ̂SCondUCACL (starting from SCondUCACL ) and to give an explicit complex-
ity bound for it. For the calculi for the variants CondU4ACL , CondICACL , and CondI4ACL ,
termination is an open problem at present, and we plan to study it in future work.
In general, cut-freeness alone does not ensure the termination of proof search in a
sequent calculus; the presence of labels and of rules such as ( says L), (→ L), (Unit),
(ID), . . ., which increase the complexity of the sequent in a backward proof search,
are potential causes of a non-terminating proof search. However, we can prove that
the above mentioned “critical” rules can be applied in a controlled way, then the rules
introduce only a finite number of labels.
First of all, by Proposition 3, the condition (S-DT) can be expressed as
∀t, s ∈ S, if sRAt and t ∈ [|B|], then sRA∧Bt (S-DT)
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As a consequence, the calculus ̂SCondUCACL replaces the rule (DT ) in Figure 3 with the
following one:
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : B Γ, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ y ⊢ ∆
(DT )
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
where A ∧B ∈ LP.
Let us now consider a first source of non-termination, namely the possible gener-
ation of an infinite branch due to the generation of infinitely-many labels, for instance
introduced by a sequence of applications of (→ L), (→ R) and (TR). As an exam-
ple, consider the following derivation (in the applications of (→ L) we only show the
premise in the middle):
.
.
.
(TR)
w ≥ z, z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2, y : A1, z : A4, w : A4 ⊢ y : B, z : A3, w : A3
(→ R)
z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2, y : A1, z : A4 ⊢ y : B, z : A3, z : A4 → A3
(→ L)
z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2, y : A1, z : A4 ⊢ y : B, z : A3
(TR)
z ≥ y, y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2, y : A1, z : A4 ⊢ y : B, z : A3
(→ R)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2, y : A1 ⊢ y : B, y : A4 → A3
(→ L)
y ≥ x, x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2, y : A1 ⊢ y : B
(→ R)
x ≥ u, x : (A4 → A3) → A2 ⊢ x : A1 → B
(→ R)
⊢ u : ((A4 → A3) → A2) → (A1 → B)
The problem is exactly the same that affects calculi for intuitionistic propositional logic
in [20], as well as labelled calculi for modal logics K4 and S4 in [32], where specific
rules are devoted to capture the transitivity of the order relation ≤ as well as of the
accessibility relation R.
In our calculus SCondUCACL , the same problem is extended to the interplay between
the rules ( says L), ( says R), (INT ) and (Unit), as shown in the following example
(again, we only present one branch of the tree):
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.
.
.
(→ L)
x
A
−→ w, . . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), w : (A says B) → ⊥ ⊢ y : C, z : B,w : B
( says L)
x
A
−→ w, z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, z
A
−→ w, y
A
−→ z, . . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥) ⊢ y : C, z : B,w : B
(INT )
z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x, z
A
−→ w, y
A
−→ z, . . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥) ⊢ y : C, z : B,w : B
(TR)
z ≥ y, y ≥ x, z
A
−→ w, y
A
−→ z, . . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥) ⊢ y : C, z : B,w : B
(Unit)
y ≥ x, z
A
−→ w, y
A
−→ z, . . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥) ⊢ y : C, z : B,w : B
( says R)
. . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), z : (A says B) → ⊥ ⊢ y : C, z : B, z : A says B
(→ L)
. . . , x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), z : (A says B) → ⊥ ⊢ y : C, z : B
( says L)
y ≥ x, x
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ y, y
A
−→ z, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), . . . ⊢ y : C, z : B
(INT )
y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y, y
A
−→ z, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), . . . ⊢ y : C, z : B
(Unit)
x
A
−→ y, y
A
−→ z, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), . . . ⊢ y : C, z : B
( says R)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), y : (A says B) → ⊥ ⊢ y : C, y : A says B
(→ L)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥), y : (A says B) → ⊥ ⊢ y : C
( says L)
x ≥ u, x
A
−→ y, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥) ⊢ y : C
( says R)
x ≥ u, x : A says ((A says B) → ⊥) ⊢ x : A says C
(→ R)
⊢ u : (A says ((A says B) → ⊥)) → (A says C)
In order to tackle this problem, we adopt a standard technique, based on the observation
that each infinite sequence of labels is periodic, that is to say there are two worlds x
and y such that y ≥ x (x A−→ y, respectively) and, for all formulas φ, φ holds in
the world represented by x if and only if φ holds in the world represented by y. To
ensure termination, we impose a restriction on the application of the rules (→ R) and
( says R). Given a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ and two labels x and y such that y ≥ x ∈ Γ ,
we define the distance d(y, x) as the length of the longest sequence of formulas in Γ
“connecting” the two labels, i.e. d(y, x) = n if y ◦ z1, z1 ◦ z2, . . . , zn−1 ◦ x ∈ Γ , with
◦ ∈ {≥,
Ai−→}8 is the longest path between y and x in Γ . Given a derivation starting
with ⊢ u : φ, let τ be the height of the parse tree of φ. We show that we can restrict
the application of (→ R) to Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α → β (of ( says R) to Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α says β,
respectively) to the case in which d(x, u) ≤ τ , that is to say it is useless to introduce a
new label when the distance between x and u is higher than the height of the parse tree
of the initial formula.
We only sketch the argument that allows us to restrict the application of (→ R) and
( says R) as stated above. A detailed discussion can be found in [16]. Let us first prove
that the following rule:
8 In computing d(y, x) we take into account both order formulas and transition formulas. As
mentioned, this is due to the presence of (Unit), which implies that the former is a superset
of the latter.
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Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
(→˜ L)
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆
is admissible in SCondUCACL , that is to say:
Lemma 13. If the following sequents:
1. Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
2. Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α
3. Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
are derivable in SCondUCACL , then also the sequent Γ, x : α → β ⊢ ∆ is derivable in
SCondUCACL
.
Proof. First of all, we prove that the sequent Γ, x : α → β ⊢ ∆,x : ⊤ → (α → β) is
derivable in SCondUCACL . This is shown by the following derivation:
. . . , z ≥ x ⊢ . . . , z ≥ x . . . , z : α ⊢ . . . , z : α . . . , z : β ⊢ . . . , z : β
(→ L)
Γ, z ≥ x, y ≥ x, z ≥ y, x : α→ β, y : ⊤, z : α ⊢ ∆, z : β
(TR)
Γ, y ≥ x, z ≥ y, x : α→ β, y : ⊤, z : α ⊢ ∆, z : β
(→ R)
Γ, y ≥ x, x : α→ β, y : ⊤ ⊢ ∆, y : α→ β
(→ R)
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆,x : ⊤ → (α→ β)
By the admissibility of weakening (Theorem 5), we have a derivation in SCondUCACL for
(i) Γ, x : α → β ⊢ ∆, y : α, x : ⊤ → (α → β) and for (ii) Γ, x : α → β, y : β ⊢
∆,x : ⊤ → (α→ β).
Again by weakening, since 1. is derivable, also (1′) Γ, x : α → β, x : ⊤ → (α →
β) ⊢ ∆, y : α, y ≥ x and (1′′) Γ, x : α → β, x : ⊤ → (α → β), y : β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
are derivable in SCondUCACL . The same for (2
′) Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→
β) ⊢ ∆, y : α and (3′) Γ, x : α → β, y : α → β, x : ⊤ → (α → β), y : β ⊢ ∆. Since
⊤ is an abbreviation for P → P , it immediately follows that (∗) Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ →
(α→ β) ⊢ ∆, y : α, y : ⊤ and (∗∗) Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β), y : β ⊢ ∆, y : ⊤
are derivable in SCondUCACL .
Since (cut) is admissible (Theorem 9), we can prove that the sequent (a) Γ, x :
α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α is derivable in SCondUCACL :
(i) Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α, x : ⊤ → (α→ β)
(1′) Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β) ⊢ ∆, y : α, y ≥ x
(∗) Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β) ⊢ ∆, y : α, y : ⊤
(2′) Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β) ⊢ ∆, y : α
(→ L)
Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β) ⊢ ∆, y : α
(cut)
(a) Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α
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Again, since (cut) is admissible, we prove that (b) Γ, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆ is derivable
in SCondUCACL :
(ii) Γ, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆,x : ⊤ → (α→ β)
(1′′) Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β), y : β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x
(∗∗) Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β), y : β ⊢ ∆, y : ⊤
(3′) Γ, x : α→ β, y : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β), y : β ⊢ ∆
(→ L)
Γ, x : α→ β, x : ⊤ → (α→ β), y : β ⊢ ∆
(cut)
(b) Γ, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
From 1., (a) and (b) we conclude by an application of (→ L). 
Analogously, we show that the following rule is also admissible in SCondUCACL :
Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y Γ, x : A says α, y : A says α, y : α ⊢ ∆
( s˜ays L)
Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆
Lemma 14. If (1) Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y and (2) Γ, x : A says α, y :
A says α, y : α ⊢ ∆ are derivable in SCondUCACL , then also Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆ is
derivable in SCondUCACL .
Proof. Let us first prove that the sequent (i) Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆,x : A says (A says α)
has a derivation in SCondUCACL , as shown by the following derivation:
. . . , x
A
−→ z ⊢ . . . , x
A
−→ z . . . , z : α ⊢ ∆, z : α
( says L)
Γ, x : A says α, z ≥ y, x A−→ z, x A−→ y, y A−→ z ⊢ ∆, z : α
(INT )
Γ, x : A says α, y ≥ x, x A−→ y, y A−→ z ⊢ ∆, z : α
(Unit)
Γ, x : A says α, x A−→ y, y A−→ z ⊢ ∆, z : α
( says R)
Γ, x : A says α, x A−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : A says α
( says R)
(i) Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆,x : A says (A says α)
Since weakening is admissible in SCondUCACL (Theorem 5), from (i) we obtain a deriva-
tion also for (ii) Γ, x : A says α, y : α ⊢ ∆,x : A says (A says α).
Again, since weakening is admissible in SCondUCACL , from (1) we obtain a derivation
of (1′) Γ, x : A says α, x : A says (A says α), y : α ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y, and from (2) we
obtain a derivation for (2′) Γ, x : A says α, y : A says α, x : A says (A says α), y :
α ⊢ ∆. Since (cut) is admissible (Theorem 9), we can conclude as follows:
(1) Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆, x A−→ y
(ii) Γ, x : A says α, y : α ⊢
∆, x : A says (A says α)
(1′) Γ, x : A says α, x : A says (A says α), y : α ⊢ ∆, x A−→ y
(2′) Γ, x : A says α, y : A says α, x : A says (A says α), y : α ⊢ ∆
( says L)
Γ, x : A says α, x : A says (A says α), y : α ⊢ ∆
(cut)
Γ, x : A says α, y : α ⊢ ∆
( says L)
Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆
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
We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 11. Let ⊢ u : φ be a sequent and let τ be the height of the parse tree of φ.
In order to check whether ⊢ u : φ is derivable, the rules (→ R) and ( says R) can be
reformulated as follows:
Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆, y : β
(→ R)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : α→ β
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : α
( says R)
Γ ⊢ ∆,x : A says α
where the following conditions hold:
1. y is new, that is to say it does not occur in Γ and ∆;
2. d(x, u) ≤ τ .
Proof. (Sketch) Let us consider a sequent of the form Γ, x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 :
β ⊢ ∆, where ◦ ∈ {→, says }, and suppose that a formula γ ◦ δ occurs negatively in β,
that is to say in a way such that the application of the rules of the calculi could lead to
a sequent of the form Γ ′, x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β ⊢ ∆′, x0 : γ ◦ δ. Suppose also
that, for all l such that x0 : χ1 ◦χ2 ◦ . . . ◦ χl ∈ Γ , we have that l ≤ n. Furthermore, by
Lemmas 13 and 14, we can consider, without loss of generality, only proofs in which
any application of (◦L) is replaced by an application of the corresponding (◦˜L). An
application of (◦R) to x0 : γ ◦ δ introduces (backward) a new label x1, as well as a
formula x1 ≥ x0, either (i) directly, in case ◦ =→, or (ii) by an application of (Unit) in
case ◦ = says and the transition formula x0
γ
−→ x1 has been introduced (backward)
by the application of ( says R). The rule (◦˜L) can be applied to both the principal
formulas x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn and x0 : β by using the label x1, obtaining a branch
containing a sequent whose left hand side contains the following formulas:
x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β
x1 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x1 : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β, x1 : β
Since γ ◦ δ occurs negatively in β, a new label x2 can be further introduced by an
application of (◦R) to x1 : γ ◦ δ, thus introducing (backward) a formula x2 ≥ x1, again
either directly by (→ R) or by means of an application of (Unit) with ( says R). In
case ◦ = says , by an application of (INT ), also x0
γ
−→ x2 is added to the branch.
By an application of (TR), also x2 ≥ x0 is introduced. The rule (◦˜L) can be further
applied by using x2 to both the principal formulas x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn and x0 : β.
We obtain a branch containing a sequent whose left hand side contains the following
formulas:
x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β
x1 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x1 : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β, x1 : β
x2 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x2 : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x2 : α3 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β, x1 : β, x2 : β
And so on, obtaining a branch containing xn−1 ≥ xn−2, . . . , xn−1 ≥ x0, x1 ≥ x0, the
formulas:
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x0 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β
x1 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x1 : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β, x1 : β
x2 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x2 : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x2 : α3 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, x0 : β, x1 : β, x2 : β
.
.
.
xn−2 : α1 ◦ . . .◦αn, xn−2 : α2 ◦ . . .◦αn, . . . , xn−2 : αn−1 ◦αn, x0 : β, . . . , xn−2 : β
xn−1 : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, xn−1 : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, . . . , xn−1 : αn, x0 : β, . . . , xn−1 : β
and, in case ◦ = says , the transition formulas x0
γ
−→ x1, . . . , x0
γ
−→ xn−1, xn−2
γ
−→
xn−1. We can conclude that it is useless to apply again the rules (◦R) to xn−1 : γ ◦ δ,
thus generating a new label xn. Indeed, since n is the highest l such that x0 : χ1 ◦ χ2 ◦
. . . ◦ χl ∈ Γ , if xn : αn is needed to close the branch, also xn−1 : αn can be used to
close such branch, because xn would label exactly the same formulas of xn−1, namely:
xn : α1 ◦ α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, xn : α2 ◦ . . . ◦ αn, . . . , xn : αn, x0 : β, . . . , xn : β. 
Furthermore, we need the following lemmas:
Lemma 15. If a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x is derivable in SCondUCACL , then either Γ ⊢ ∆ is
derivable or y ≥ x ∈ Γ or y = x.
Proof. (Sketch) Intuitively, in order to prove a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x, we observe
that y ≥ x is introduced (looking forward) either by an application of (→ L) or by
weakening. In the latter case, obviously Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable too. In the former one, the
only way to prove y ≥ x in the leftmost premise Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x is by (AX≥) or (AX).
In the first case, we are done, since x = y. In the other one, since (→ R) and (TR)
are the only rules introducing a formula y ≥ x in the left hand side of a sequent in a
backward proof search, and since such rules are invertible (Lemma 7), we can assume,
without loss of generality, that they have been applied before (→ L), therefore y ≥ x
already belongs to Γ . The rigorous proof is by induction on the height of the derivation
of Γ ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x. 
We can reason analogously for the transition formulas, considering that a formula x A−→
y in the right hand side of a sequent can only be proved (backward) by an application
of (EQ):
Lemma 16. If a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆,x A−→ y is derivable in SCondUCACL , then either Γ ⊢ ∆
is derivable or x A
′
−→ y ∈ Γ .
The following facts allow to obtain a terminating calculus from SCondUCACL :
– The rules of SCondUCACL introduce only a finite number of labels in a backward proof
search: labels are only introduced by the rules (→ R) and ( says R), restricted as
stated by Theorem 11 above, by formulas occurring negatively in the initial sequent,
which are finite.
– It is useless to apply the rules (TR), (INT ), (Unit), (ID), (C), (CA), (CA −
conv), (DT ), and (MON ) more than once on the same principal formula. As an
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example, let us consider the rule (Unit): we can restrict its application to Γ, x A−→
y ⊢ ∆ only to the case in which the rule has not been previously applied to x A−→ y
in that branch, i.e. if y ≥ x 6∈ Γ . Similarly for the other rules.
– A backward application of (CA−conv ) introduces x A∨B−→ y in the premise, where
x
A∨B
−→ y does not belong to the conclusion, but whereA∨B is a principal belonging
to LP. The same for (CA). The same for (DT ) and (MON ), introducing x
A∧B
−→ y.
Since LP is finite, these rules will be applied a finite number of times in the same
branch.
– The rule (→ L), applied to a sequent Γ, x : α → β ⊢ ∆, leads to a premise
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y ≥ x, and can thus be reapplied without any control. However,
it is useless to apply (→ L) on the same formula x : α → β more than once in
each branch in a backward proof search, introducing the same formula y ≥ x in the
leftmost premise. Moreover, by Lemma 15 we can restrict the choice of the order
formula y ≥ x introduced in a way such that either y ≥ x ∈ Γ or y = x: this is
explained by the fact that no rule of SCondUCACL have a formula y ≥ x in the right
hand side of a sequent as a principal formula. Therefore, the only way to prove it
in a backward search is either by (AX), i.e. by a sequent also having y ≥ x in its
left hand side (then, we can choose among y ≥ x already in Γ ) or by (AX≥), thus
choosing y = x. The same for (ATM ).
– Similarly to the previous point, it is useless to apply ( says L) on the same formula
x : A says γ more than once in each branch, introducing (backward) the same
formula x A−→ y in the leftmost premise. Moreover, by Lemma 16, the choice
of the transition x A−→ y to be used is restricted to formulas such that, for some
formula A′, there exists x A
′
−→ y ∈ Γ . Intuitively, this follows from the fact that
a transition formula on the right hand side of a sequent can only be proved by an
application of (EQ). Moreover, since (EQ) only involves transition formulas, the
premise introducing x A−→ y can be reduced to x A
′
−→ y ⊢ x
A
−→ y. A similar
restriction applies also to (MON) and (CA).
The resulting terminating calculus ̂SCondUCACL is shown in Figure 7. It is worth noticing
that (AX) is restricted to atomic formulas, and that (AX≥) is not needed due to the
reformulation of the other rules.
By the above facts, it follows that:
Theorem 12. A sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable in SCondUCACL if and only if Γ ⊢ ∆ is
derivable in ̂SCondUCACL .
Theorem 13. The sequent calculus ̂SCondUCACL ensures a terminating proof search, then
the logic CondUCACL is decidable.
Proof. Given a formula φ, just observe that there is only a finite number of derivations
of the sequent ⊢ u : φ, as both the length of a proof and the number of labelled formulas
which may occur in it is finite. 
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(AX) (AX⊥)
(ATM )
(EQ)
(C)
(ID)
(CA− conv)
if y : P !∈ Γ
if z ≥ x "∈ Γ
if y : A !∈ Γ
if z
A
−→ z #∈ Γ
if {x
A
−→ y, x
B
−→ y} ∩ Γ = ∅
if x
A∨B
−→ y #∈ Γ
if x
A∧B
−→ y #∈ Γ
if {x
A
−→ y, x
B
−→ y} #⊆ Γ
y ≥ x ∈ Γ
P ∈ ATMif
A ∨B ∈ LP
A ∧B ∈ LP
(→ L)
and
(TR)
u new
( says R) ( says L)
(DT )
(MON )
y new
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : A says α
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : α
Γ, x : A says α ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y, x
B
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
A ∧B ∈ LP
A ∨B ∈ LP
Γ ⊢ ∆
(INT )
Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
if x
A
′
−→ y ∈ Γ
(CA)
(∧R) (∧L)
(∨R) (∨L)
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α ∧ β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α
Γ, x : α ∧ β ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α, x : β ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α, x : β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α ∨ β
Γ, x : β ⊢ ∆Γ, x : α ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α ∨ β ⊢ ∆
(→ R)
y new
Γ, y ≥ x, y : α ⊢ ∆, y : β
Γ ⊢ ∆, x : α→ β
u : B ⊢ u : Au : A ⊢ u : B
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, x
B
−→ y
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : α→ β ⊢ ∆, y : α Γ, x : α→ β, y : β ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ x, z ≥ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, y ≥ x ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : P, y : P ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : ⊥ ⊢ ∆Γ, x : P ⊢ ∆, x : P
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y, y : A ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y, z
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
Γ, z ≥ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A∨B
−→ y, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
if d(x, u) ≤ τ
x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ x
A
−→ y
(Unit)
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⇒ ∆
Γ, y ≥ x, x
A
−→ y ⇒ ∆
if y ≥ x "∈ Γ
Γ, x
A
−→ y, x
A∧B
−→ y ⊢ ∆Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆, y : B
Γ, x
A
−→ y ⊢ ∆
Γ, x : A says α, y : α ⊢ ∆
Γ, y ≥ x, y
A
−→ z, x
A
−→ z ⊢ ∆
if y ≥ x ∈ Γ
and x
A
′
−→ y ∈ Γ
x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ x
A∨B
−→ y
x
A
′
−→ y ⊢ x
A∧B
−→ y
and x
A
′
−→ y ∈ Γ
if x
A
−→ z #∈ Γ
if d(x, u) ≤ τ
P ∈ ATM
Fig. 7. The terminating calculus ̂SCondUCACL
. In order to prove that a formula φ is valid in CondUCACL ,
the calculus checks whether there is a derivation of ⊢ u : φ. Therefore, u is the label in the initial
sequent.
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This itself gives the decidability of CondUCACL . We have also developed a Prolog proto-
type implementing the decision procedure ̂SCondUCACL [17].
We can give an explicit space complexity bound for CondUCACL . As usual, a proof
may have an exponential size because of the branching introduced by the rules. However
we can obtain a much sharper space complexity bound since we do not need to store
the whole proof, but only a sequent at a time plus additional information to carry on the
proof search; this standard technique is similar to the one adopted in [19, 26]:
Theorem 14. Let n be the length of the string representing a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆. The
problem of deciding provability of Γ ⊢ ∆ in CondUCACL is decidable in O(n4 logn)
space.
Proof. First, observe that, in the proof search of ⊢ u : φ, with | φ |= n, new labels are
introduced only by (sub)formulas occurring negatively in φ. Let τ be the height of the
parse tree of φ. Theorem 11 states that, given a formula (of the form either x : α → β
or x : A says γ) introducing a new label in the branch, it can be applied only if the
distance between x and the label u in the sequent of the root is less or equal to τ .
Obviously, τ is bounded by n. Theorefore, each (sub)formula occurring negatively in
φ generates at most n labels, then, since there are O(n) (sub)formulas, the number of
different labels introduced in a branch is O(n2). Suppose also that | LP | is bounded
by O(n). All possible (sub)formulas in φ are, obviously, O(n), therefore the number
of different labelled formulas is O(n3). The rules of ̂SCondUCACL can be applied to each
labelled formula: at most n rules are applied to each formula, then we have that the
length of each branch of a proof tree is bounded by O(n4).
In searching a proof, there are two kinds of branching to consider: AND-branching
caused by the rules with multiple premises and OR-branching (backtracking points in
a depth first search) caused by the choice of the rule to apply. We store only one se-
quent at a time and maintain a stack containing information sufficient to reconstruct
the branching points of both types. Each stack entry contains the principal formula, the
name of the rule applied and an index which allows to reconstruct the other branches
on return to the branching points. The stack entries represent thus backtracking points
and the index within the entry allows one to reconstruct both the AND branching and to
check whether there are alternatives to explore (OR branching). The working sequent
on a return point is recreated by replaying the stack entries from the bottom of the stack
using the information in the index (for instance, in the case of ( says L) applied to the
principal formulax : A says γ, the index will indicate which premise-first or second-we
have to expand and the label y involved in the formula x A−→ y).
A proof begins with the end sequent ⊢ u : φ and the empty stack. Each rule appli-
cation generates a new sequent and extends the stack. If the current sequent is an axiom
we pop the stack until we find an AND branching point to be expanded. If there are not,
the end sequent ⊢ u : φ is derivable and we have finished. If the current sequent is not
an axiom and no rule can be applied to it, we pop the stack entries and we continue at
the first available entry with some alternative left (a backtracking point). If there are no
such entries, the end sequent is not derivable.
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The entire process must terminate since: (i) the depth of the stack is bounded by the
length of a branch proof, thus it isO(n4), (ii) the branching is bounded by the number of
rules, the number of premises of any rule and the number of labelled formulas occurring
in one sequent, the last being O(n3).
To evaluate the space requirement, we have that each subformula of the initial la-
belled formula can be represented by a positional index into the initial labelled formula,
which requiresO(log n) bits. Moreover, also each label can be represented byO(log n)
bits. Thus, to store the working sequent we need O(n3 logn) space, since there may
occur O(n3) labelled subformulas. Similarly, each stack entry requires O(log n) bits,
as the name of the rule requires constant space and the index O(log n) bits. Having
depth O(n4), to store the whole stack requires O(n4 log n) space. Thus we obtain that
provability in CondUCACL is decidable in O(n4 logn) space. 
Given a formula φ ∈ L, since ̂SCondUCACL is sound and complete with respect to the
semantics of the logic CondUCACL , in order to check whether φ is valid in CondUCACL we
can check whether ⊢ u : φ is derivable in ̂SCondUCACL . It immediately follows that:
Theorem 15. Given a formula φ ∈ L, let n be the length of the string representing φ.
The problem of deciding validity of φ in CondUCACL is decidable in O(n4 logn) space.
6 Related work and Conclusions
Related Work. Many formal frameworks have been proposed to specify and reason
about access control systems [4, 6, 18, 22, 23]. Recently, as reported in [14], construc-
tive logics have been recognized to be well suited for reasoning about authorization,
because constructive proofs preserve the justification of statements during reasoning
and, therefore, information about accountability is not lost. Classical logics, instead,
allow proofs that discard evidence.
Abadi in [2] presents a formal study about connections between many possible ax-
iomatizations of the “says” operator, as well as higher-level policy constructs such as
delegation (Speaks for) and control. Abadi provides a strong argument to use construc-
tivism in logic for access control, in fact he shows that from a well-known axiom like
(UNIT) in a classical logic we can deduce A says ϕ → (ϕ ∨ A says ψ). The axiom
above is called Escalation and it represents a rather degenerate interpretation of says ,
i.e., if a principal says ϕ then, either ϕ holds or the principal can say anything. On the
contrary, if we interpret the says within an intuitionistic logic we can avoid Escalation.
Although several authorization logics employ the says modality, a limited amount
of work has been done to study the formal logical properties of says , Speaks for and
other constructs.
Garg and Abadi [13] study a class of access control logics (ICL, ICL⇒ and ICLB)
via a sound and complete translation into modal logic S4 by relying on a slight sim-
plification of Go¨del’s translation from intuitionistic logic to S4, and by extending it to
formulas of the form A says ϕ. The translation to S4 provides decidability and com-
plexity results for this class of logics of access control. Among the conditional access
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control logics we have presented, the logic CondI4ACL contains the characterizing ac-
cess control axioms of ICL, namely (UNIT), (K) and (C4). CondI4ACL derives all the
axioms of ICL and is srictly stronger than ICL. As we have seen in Section 2.3, there
are formulas of ICL⇒ that are derivable in CondI4ACL , but not in ICL⇒. Concerning the
treatment of boolean principals, we have discussed in Section 2.2 the differences among
our definition and the one in [13].
Garg [12] adopts an ad-hoc version of constructive S4 called DTL0 and embeds ex-
isting approaches into it. Constructive S4 has been chosen because of its intuitionistic
Kripke semantics which DTL0 extends by adding the notion of view, i.e., a mapping
from principals to sets of worlds. DTL0 contains, as characterizing axioms, (K), (4) and
(C). The axioms (K), (4) and (C) are derivable in CondICACL . In particular, (4) is weaker
than (I) and derivable from it. The preorder among atomic principals can be captured
in CondICACL through the “speaks for” relation (which is reflexive and transitive), and
satisfies axiom (S) (corresponding to the (Speaks For) axiom). The semantics of DTL0
has strong similarities with the semantics of CondICACL , although it does not deal with
boolean principals. It can be observed that the Kripke models for DTL0 include the
semantic conditions of axioms (ID) and (MP), However, as these axioms are not ex-
pressible in the language of DTL0, they are not derivable from the axiomatization. As a
difference, the aim of our proposal is to provide a modular approach to the definition of
access control logics and their semantics, in which there is a one to one correspondence
among semantic properties and characterizing axioms.
It has to be observed that, adopting a fixed semantics like S4 does not permit to
study the correspondence between axioms of access control logics and Kripke struc-
tures. Suppose we look at says as a principal indexed modality 2A, if we rely on S4
we would have as an axiom 2Aϕ → ϕ, which means: everything that A says holds.
To overcome this problem, both in [12, 13], Kripke semantics is weakened with the
addition of views which relativize the reasoning to a subset of worlds. Although this
approach provides sound and complete semantics for a certain combination of axioms
(those included in ICL), it breaks the useful bound between modality axioms and rela-
tions of Kripke structures.
Boella et al. [7] define a logical framework called FSL (Fibred Security Language),
based on fibring semantics [11] by looking at “says” as a (fibred) modal operator. FSL
is, in general, not decidable and its formalization is limited to Kripke-style semantics.
In fact, no proof method for FSL has been provided. Moreover, the representation of the
speaks for in FSL is limited to the definition of axiom schemas of the type A says ϕ→
B says ϕ, which means that, given a reference monitor modeled with FSL, it is not
possible to introduce new speaks for relationships at run-time.
Conclusions. We have defined four intuitionistic conditional logics for Access Control
called CondUCACL , CondU4ACL , CondICACL and CondI4ACL . We have presented a sound,
complete and cut-free sequent calculus for such logics. Also, we have shown that prov-
ability in CondUCACL is decidable in O(n4logn) space, in agreement with the PSPACE
results given in [13] for the logic ICL. With respect to the work in [12, 13], we iden-
tify canonical properties for axioms of the logic, i.e., first-order conditions on Kripke
structures that are necessary and sufficient for the corresponding axiom to hold.
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We believe that this methodology has several advantages. First, conditional log-
ics allow a natural formalization of the says modality including the specification of
boolean principals as formulas as well as a natural treatment of Speaks for. Second,
the identification of canonical properties for access control axioms provides a natural
deconstruction of access control logics. By deconstruction we mean the possibility to
craft access control logics that adopt any combination of axioms for which canonical
properties exist. For instance, not all access control systems adopt (UNIT) as an axiom
[22, 5, 18], but the translation in [13] does not provide an embedding in S4 for a logic
without (UNIT). In general, the approach in [13] does not provide a methodology to de-
construct access control logics. In our approach, instead, we can formalize a logic and
a calculus without (UNIT) which is still sound and complete, by dropping the semantic
condition (S-UNIT) and the corresponding rule (Unit) in the calculus, as shown for the
logics CondICACL and CondI4ACL and the respective calculi SCondICACL and SCondI4ACL .
We believe that choosing axioms for access control logics depends on the needs of
security practitioners. By looking at says as a conditional modality, we can offer a
formal framework to study the axioms of access control via canonical properties on the
semantics, and to build calculi to carry out automated deduction. Of course, for each
combination of axioms, the decidability and the complexity of the resulting logic as
well as the termination of the calculus have to be determined.
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